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A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement
David L. Markell* and Robert L. Glicksman*
Abstract
The law review literature has long-recognized that effective enforcement is an essential
component of effective regulation. Yet much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the
enforcement challenge or another. For example, the underlying theory about optimal levels of
enforcement has received considerable attention, as have topics such as the relative merits of
using deterrence-based versus cooperation-based approaches and the use of citizen suits.
The purpose of this article is to fill a gap in the law review literature by considering
agencies’ enforcement and compliance promotion function holistically. In doing so, the article
approaches the challenge from an “inside-out” perspective, a perspective that administrative law
scholars have found to be lacking in the literature.
The article proposes a three-layered conceptual framework for considering options for
structuring the administrative agency enforcement and compliance promotion function. The first
layer consists of five components of effective enforcement and compliance: norm clarity, norm
achievability, verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of
legitimacy. The second involves the inter-related character of these components and highlights
the importance of fitting each into a particular enforcement and compliance regime so that
agencies may gain synergistic benefits and consider the need to make difficult trade-offs. Third,
and finally, our conceptual framework includes four contextual design issues that create
additional challenges in determining the appropriate content of each of the five key components
of effective enforcement and compliance: the hybrid character of contemporary governance
efforts; the importance of “reality-checking” enforcement options through close attention to past
performance as well as future challenges and opportunities; the dynamic character of
environmental governance challenges; and the salience of possible design changes and the need
to prioritize design improvements. The article suggests that it is important to consider all three
layers in developing an effective enforcement and compliance promotion regime.
The article tests our conceptual framework by including a case study of an ongoing
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) effort to reinvent its enforcement and compliance
promotion program and by applying our framework to EPA’s initiative. This case study
illustrates the value of our framework in evaluating regulatory design options for the
enforcement and compliance promotion function.
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Introduction
The law review literature has long-recognized that effective enforcement is an essential
component of effective regulation.1 Yet much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the
enforcement challenge or another. For example, the underlying theory about optimal levels of
enforcement has received considerable attention, 2 as have topics such as the relative merits of
using deterrence-based versus cooperation-based approaches and the use of citizen suits.3
1

See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) [hereinafter Markell,
Deterrence-Based Enforcement].
2
See, e.g., Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 860-61 (2012); Michael Faure,
Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
293, 320-30 (2012); David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV.
969, 1004-06 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of

2

The purpose of this Article is to fill a gap in the law review literature by considering
agencies’ enforcement and compliance promotion function holistically. The Article approaches
the challenge from an “inside-out” perspective,4 a perspective that administrative law scholars
have found to be lacking in the academic literature.5

Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 563-64 (1986). Each of these sources cites the seminal article on optimal
deterrence, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
3
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); Robert L.
Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical
Industry: Deterrence-Based v. Cooperative Enforcement, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 603 (2007);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833
(1985).
We credit Professor Engstrom’s insightful and provocative recent article, which seeks to improve
regulatory design in this realm, for motivating this effort. Professor Engstrom focused on the rationalization of
private and public enforcement litigation through agency gatekeeping options for private enforcement litigation,
both conceptually and in the context of specific agencies such as EPA. While we focus here on EPA, many of our
points are generalizable beyond that agency. We obviously bear responsibility for any missteps we may have made
in attempting a reformulation and quite different elaboration than Engstrom’s of the central challenges of designing
an apparatus that is responsive to current challenges facing the modern regulatory state in the enforcement realm.
For insightful syntheses of economists’, political scientists’ and management theorists’ perspectives on regulatory
design in addressing environmental challenges, see, e.g., Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An
Economic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 43 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran
R. Young eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT]; Maria Carmen
Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance and Political Science, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 69; Andrew King & Michael W. Toffel, Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving
Environmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the Management Literature, in id. at 98. The
Canadian Auditor General has used a “plan-do-check-improve” model to evaluate management of Environment
Canada’s enforcement program. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development, Enforcing the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, at 8 (Dec.
2011) [hereinafter Auditor General Report], available at http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/english/parl_cesd_201112_03_e_36031.html.
4
Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law
Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578, 597-603 (2011) (contrasting “inside-out” accountability, which they
describe as “the potential of promoting . . . effective government from inside the bureaucracy. . .” and note has been
a focus of public administration scholars, with administrative law scholarship, which has focused on “outside-in”
accountability stemming from the administrative presidency, congressional oversight, and judicial review).
5
Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319 (2013) (noting the prevalence of “recent calls for bringing an
emphasis on inside-out legitimacy”); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 4, at 578 (noting that “[administrative law
scholarship focuses almost exclusively” on controlling agency operations from outside of the agencies, and
observing that, “with only a few exceptions . . . administrative law scholars treat agencies as a black box to be
controlled from the outside, using political oversight and judicial review”). Some legal scholars, of course, have
paid close attention to the operation of discrete aspects of agency enforcement regimes. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ,
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (revised edition) (University of Texas Press 2012);
Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (discussing welfaremaximizing strategies to create ideal governance); Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing the Public Health Aspects of
Environmental Enforcement: Qualitative versus Quantitative Evaluations of Enforcement Effort, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J.
403 (2009) (urging greater reliance on quantitative metrics to drive agency enforcement choices). The federal
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), among others, has engaged in numerous efforts over the years to develop,
revisit, and improve upon agency approaches in the enforcement and compliance arena. See, e.g., James M. Strock,
EPA’s Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10327 (August 1990); EPA, Enforcement FourYear Strategic Plan: Enhanced Environmental Enforcement for the 1990’s (Feb. 1991), available at
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The Article begins by proposing a three-layered conceptual framework for considering
options for structuring the administrative agency enforcement and compliance promotion
function. First, it identifies five components of effective regulation both generally and in the
specific context of regulatory enforcement and compliance: norm clarity, norm achievability,
verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy.6 Beyond
examining the importance of these components in establishing and implementing enforcement
and compliance promotion policies, we consider some of the complexities involved in fitting
each component into particular regimes so that agencies may take advantage of opportunities to
gain synergistic benefits and consider the need to make difficult trade-offs. This assessment of
how each component relates to the others is the second layer in the framework we propose.7
The third layer of our framework for evaluating enforcement and compliance promotion
functions relates to what we term “contextual design challenges.”8 One contextual design issue
http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/owrccatalog.nsf/9da204a4b4406ef885256ae0007a79c7/fbfb518793cd84c385256b060
0723741!OpenDocument. EPA is in the midst of its latest initiative, which it calls Next Generation Compliance.
See infra Part III. Government interlocutors, scholars, and others have also weighed in on the structure of agency
enforcement programs and continue to do so. E.g., National Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating
Environmental Progress: How EPA and the States Can Improve the Quality of Enforcement and Compliance
Information (June 2001); U.S. GAO, Environmental Protection: More Consistency Needed Among EPA Regions in
Approach to Enforcement (2000), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf; U.S. EPA Office of Inspector
General, Consolidated Review of the Air Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Programs III (1997); U.S. EPA
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. GAO, EPA’s Effort to Improve and Make More Consistent its Compliance and
Enforcement Activities (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-840T.
We have also sought to advance thinking in this arena. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L.
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (2003);
Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 1; David Markell, EPA Enforcement: A Heightened Emphasis
on Mitigation Relief, 45 TRENDS 13 (2014); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government
in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19 (2014).
6
See infra Part IA. As with virtually all categorization efforts, ours is contestable, and alternative characterizations
are possible. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Principles of Environmental Enforcement I-5 (Feb. 1992) (listing as important
components of an effective enforcement program factors such as: 1) establishing enforceable requirements; 2)
identifying regulated parties; 3) setting priorities; 4) promoting compliance; 5) monitoring compliance; 6)
responding to violations; 7) clarifying roles and responsibilities; and 8) evaluating performance) [hereinafter EPA,
Environmental Enforcement]; Paul B. Smyth and Milo C. Mason, Making Tough Choices Easier: Compliance and
Enforcement 102, 3-SPG NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2004); Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation
and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 423 (1982) (former EPA Administrator listing as characteristics of
effective regulation clarity and certainty, reasonableness and fairness, and efficiency and cost-effectiveness);
Meredith James, Results-Based Environmental Regulation in Canada: Creative Solution or Re-Branding
Regulation?, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 139, 143 (2009) (identifying effectiveness and efficiency as the usual focus of
debates about tool selection and including as characteristics of effective regulation “clear, measurable, enforceable
standards and mandatory language”). Cf. Dr. Paul Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private
Monitoring of Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel Industry, 38
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1 (2010-2011) (“Effective regulation has three essential components. First, the law must
develop standards; second, there must be sufficient monitoring of compliance to detect non-compliance; and third,
there must be some form of motivation to avoid non-compliance.”) (citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 5 (1982)); Report of the Committee on Ethics, 15 ENERGY L.J. 193, 195 (1994) (listing as components of
effective ethics regulation moral resonance, clarity of purposes, non-triviality, practicality, equity, and
proportionality).
7
See infra Part 1B.
8
See infra Part IC. The purpose of identifying these challenges is to provide an organizing structure for comparing
the merits of alternative ways to design administrative programs such as enforcement and compliance inducement
programs. For alternative conceptualizations, see, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
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relates to the hybrid character of contemporary governance efforts; as the “new governance” and
other literatures reflect,9 governance is no longer the exclusive province of the government, if it
ever was, and those seeking to design effective regulation should consider the multiplicity of
actors.10 The capacity of each actor to affect compliance is relevant to the desirability of
alternative options for the structuring of enforcement and compliance programs. A second
challenge is the importance of confronting past performance as well as future challenges and
opportunities. Past failures to consider performance of wide swaths of the regulated community,
for example, counsel in favor of considering changes to enforcement regimes to account for at
least the more significant outliers.11 A third design issue stems from the dynamic character of
governance challenges. As the regulatory treatment of the environmental issues posed by
climate change reflects, normative objectives are likely to be dynamic in some cases.12 The
nature of the tools available to government and other key stakeholders also may shift because of
factors such as technological advances and changes in resource availability. A sharp reduction in
government enforcement resources, for example, might suggest the need to facilitate private
enforcement. It is essential to consider these dynamic aspects of the regulatory landscape in
structuring enforcement and compliance efforts. Finally, the salience of possible design changes,
and the need to prioritize design improvements, is a fourth critical contextual design challenge.
Resource limitations, for example, limit government enforcement and compliance promotion
capacity, requiring policymakers to decide which efforts are the most critical.13
The Article also tests our conceptual framework by including a case study of an ongoing
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) effort to reinvent its enforcement and compliance
promotion program and by applying our framework to EPA’s initiative. 14 This case study

Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (providing a framework for a
governance model which includes “increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity
and competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and noncoerciveness,
adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among proliferated norm-generating entities”).
9
See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 8, at 466-70 (describing the goals of new governance as “economic efficiency, political
legitimacy, and social democracy”); Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The
Localization of Regulation, 36 J. L. & SOC’Y 145, 146-150 (2009) (discussing the characteristics of new governance
in an environmental context).
10
E.g., Engstrom, supra note 3 (focusing on rationalization of private and public enforcement litigation as part of
the effort to improve regulatory design).
11
EPA is attempting such an assessment in its reinvention effort, as we discuss in more detail in Part III, infra.
12
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2014); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17, 66-67 (2010) J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the
Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2008).
13
EPA appears to be at risk of experiencing such reductions. See infra Part II; Sean Reilly, EPA sees reductions in
enforcement, inspections through 2018, FEDERALTIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20140221/MGMT05/302240003/EPA-sees-reductions-enforcementinspections-through-2018.
14
See infra Part III. This article offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about whether legal
scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world. It attempts to evaluate the real world practicability of our
conception of the manner in which the regulatory state operates in light of an agency’s actual practices and
procedures. For differing views about the value of legal scholarship in terms of the resolution of real-world
challenges, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (endorsing scholarship that reflects “a healthy balance of theory and
doctrine”); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship as Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193,
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illustrates the potential value of our framework in evaluating regulatory design options for the
enforcement and compliance promotion function.
Part I of the Article lays out our conceptual framework. It first identifies and examines
why each of the five components of effective regulation we have identified is important in
establishing and implementing enforcement and compliance promotion policies. Next, Part I
explains why it is important in thinking about the structure and content of an enforcement and
compliance program to consider these five components holistically; it is, in our view, of
foundational importance to consider how the structure and operation of each of the components
influences the others. The third section of Part I introduces the third layer of our multi-layered
conceptual framework, which is comprised of four contextual design challenges that we believe
may significantly influence how one should approach design and implementation of an effective
enforcement and compliance promotion regime.
Part II contextualizes how an agency might begin to consider the design of its
enforcement and compliance regime by focusing on one agency’s (EPA’s) track record. This
Part examines two features of past performance that are of particular importance (the adequacy
of agency resources and the nature of the regulated community) and the implications of changes
in each feature for the future operation of enforcement and compliance programs. This Part
helps to ground the paper by offering our perspective on EPA’s past enforcement performance
and some significant challenges and opportunities the agency faces.
Part III is an initial attempt to give our framework a test run. It provides an overview of
an ongoing EPA initiative to re-invent its promotion of compliance with the Clean Water Act
(CWA)’s regulatory requirements. In this Part, we consider EPA’s ongoing reinvention effort in
light of the conceptual framework we have introduced (in Part I) and EPA’s track record and
anticipated challenges and opportunities (discussed in Part II). In doing so, we explain how the
application of our framework would enrich EPA’s analysis of available options for restructuring
its CWA compliance promotion program. In addition to providing insights on EPA’s program,
we hope our work fuels analysis of the design and implementation of other regulatory programs
and, relatedly, demonstrates how the context in which a particular program operates is likely to
affect the manner in which the regulatory components we have identified can contribute to (or
detract from) effective regulation.15

204 (2010) (urging scholarship that “is both grounded and theoretical, actively involved in the world of its subject
matter, and for that reason, able to think about it in fresh ways”).
We are most familiar with EPA and hence have focused on regulatory design issues based on that agency’s
compliance promotion strategies. Regulatory design is likely to be highly dependent on context, but insights from
EPA’s enforcement program are likely to be particularly valuable more broadly for various reasons, including the
agency’s extensive experience, accumulated over more than forty years under different pollution control statutes, in
fostering compliance; the challenges posed by the participation of the states in pollution control regimes, which raise
federalism issues similar to those facing other agencies; and the evolution of the capacities of regulatory
stakeholders and of the challenges confronting them over time. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2012) (discussing a “unified
approach to the design of private enforcement mechanisms better tailored to the exigencies of particular regulatory
regimes”).
15
For one example of the type of case study that deserves close attention for its insights about enforcement and
compliance programs, see e.g., Joe Schieffelin, et al., Colorado’s Hazardous Waste Small Quantity Generator (SQG)
Self-Certification Program (April 2013) (on file with the authors). NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE (LeRoy C.
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I.

Effective Regulation: Key Components and Contextual Design Challenges

In fashioning or refashioning the design of a regulatory program, policymakers strive,
among other things, to create mechanisms that are effective in achieving, or at least advancing,
the program’s goals.16 The relative attractiveness of options available to an agency like EPA in
structuring and implementing its enforcement and compliance promotion function may depend
on the nature of the regulatory program. Numerous models of regulation, and hence effective
regulation, exist. For example, in the environmental field, many commentators characterize
traditional regulation as “command-and-control.” According to Professors Cole and Grossman,
“’[c]ommand-and-control’ is in essence a regulatory approach whereby the government
‘commands’ pollution reductions (e.g., by setting emissions standards) and ‘controls’ how these
reductions are achieved (e.g., through the installation of specific pollution-control
technologies).”17 Other variations include market-based approaches to regulation,18 “new
governance” approaches,19 and adaptive regulation.20 Each type of regulation has different
Paddock & Jessica A. Wentz, eds., Envtl Law Inst., 2014) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE], collects
descriptions and assessments of recent innovative federal and state environmental regulatory enforcement and
compliance programs.
16
Agency “pathologies” and other factors obviously have the potential to affect policymakers’ motivations. See
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 663-64 (discussing “bureaucratic behavioral pathologies,” such as agency capture,
agency self-aggrandizement, agencies’ predilections for overly cautious behavior, and the influence of careerist
incentives of agency personnel, in framing choices among different agency gatekeeping options.) Although there is
debate about the effectiveness of our nation’s environmental initiatives, it is well accepted both that there have been
some successes and that much more remains to be done. See, e.g., Robert Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and
Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 172
(2010) ( noting that “the [CWA] has resulted in significant progress in improving the quality of the Nation’s
waters”)
17
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887,
887 n.1 (1999). This definition is misleading for federal environmental mandates that establish performance
standards, which dictate the end result regulated entities must achieve (e.g., a certain level of pollution reduction that
a regulator determines is achievable using available technology), but not the means of achieving those results.
Regulated entities have at least some discretion to select the means. Programs that dictate both the ends and the
means are referred to as design standards, which are much rarer than performance standards in federal pollution
control law. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 151-52 (2003); Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A User's
Guide, OTA-ENV-634 (1995). As others have pointed out, the term command-and-control is a pejorative term
whose use arose out an effort by regulated businesses to depict environmental regulation as the product of
“overregulation, big government, and bureaucratic zealotry.” Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical
Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 234-35 (2011). See also David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The
Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 76 (2009) (substituting the term “traditional
regulation” for “command-and-control regulation” “[t]o avoid confusion and misleading pejorative terminology”).
As Cole and Grossman point out, critics of traditional regulation have even equated command-and-control
regulation “with ‘Soviet-style’ regulation and ‘socialist central planning,’ implying that it is both endemically
inefficient and democratically illegitimate.” Cole & Grossman, supra, at 887.
18
E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 to 7651o (emissions trading program to reduce acid rain).
19
E.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515 (2013);
Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory
Law and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227; Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323
(2009); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004).
20
E.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12 (discussing three models of regulation, traditional, market-based, and adaptive).
The list in the text of available models of environmental regulation is not exhaustive. For a succinct review of
several types of regulation, see Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 17.
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features, and requires different things to work well for it to be effective.21 Agencies like EPA
may use different types of regulation for different challenges, and they may mix and match
different approaches to address concerns as well.22
For many types of regulation, enforcement (and compliance with regulatory norms more
generally) is often characterized as essential to effective regulation,23 although it is not sufficient
to achieve desired environmental protection policy objectives.24 While recognizing that the
particular regulatory approach may affect the choice of enforcement and compliance promotion
strategies, at a macro level we suggest that it is possible to identify at least five critical
components of an effective regulatory enforcement and compliance function. Section A below
introduces and reviews these components. Section B considers some of the complexities
involved in fitting each of these components into particular regimes, including the synergies they
provide and the need to make difficult trade-offs when they threaten to work at cross-purposes.
Section C then introduces four challenges that further contextualize the task of designing the
appropriate structure and content of an agency’s enforcement and compliance promotion
function.
A.

Five Key Components of Effective Regulation

Although it is possible to describe the components of effective regulation in many
ways,25 we think at least five features are relevant to the design of a successful regulatory
enforcement and compliance program: norm clarity, norm achievability, compliance

21

See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strategies,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 237-38 (2013) (describing different features of command-and-control and
self-regulation); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 20-21 (suggesting that the type of regulation used may affect the
salience of its attributes). Definitions of “effectiveness” vary based not only on the tools or strategies to be used in a
particular regulatory scheme, but also on regulatory goals.
22 For example, under the CWA, EPA uses all of the types of regulation discussed in the text to restrict
discharges of pollutants.
23
Congress, regulators, and scholars have all subscribed to this view. See, e.g., EPA, Environmental Enforcement,
supra note 6, at 1 (“Without compliance, environmental requirements will not achieve the desired results.”); Auditor
General Report, supra note _ (noting that the Canadian counterpart to EPA, Environment Canada, similarly has
concluded that “environmental laws alone are not enough to guarantee a cleaner, better environment. These laws
also need to be enforced.”); Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 1. See also Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 189 (“Strong environmental laws
are meaningless unless they are effectively enforced.”); Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works
Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1206
(2013) (describing “what can be accomplished when a regulatory agency and [the Department of Justice] are willing
to devote substantial resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative”).
Some “regulatory” design approaches may not include an enforcement component at all or it may be quite
remote or understated, such as EPA’s 33/50 strategy. For descriptions of that program, see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 33/50 Program: The Final Record, EPA-745-R-99004 (March 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf; Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon,
EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Release and Economic Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1999).
24
See Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 23 (2013) (noting that “[w]hile enforcement is
an essential part of EPA’s compliance program, it is not realistic to think that enforcement alone will get us to the
levels of compliance envisioned by our rules”).
25
See supra note 6.
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verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy, as we
illustrate in Table 1.26
Table 1 – Components of Effective Regulation
Norm Clarity
Norm Achievability
Verifiability
The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions
Indicia of Legitimacy

1. Clarity
It is axiomatic that it is important to consider the clarity of regulatory norms in designing
effective regulations.27 There are good reasons for regulators to strive for clarity and certainty
and to create clear expectations for acceptable (and unacceptable) conduct. It is difficult for a
regulated entity to comply with its regulatory responsibilities, or for others to assess whether it
has done so, without understanding what those responsibilities are. Participants across the
spectrum of interested stakeholders recognize the value of establishing clear standards for
regulated parties to meet. Complaints about indeterminacy are heard from regulated parties as
well as members of the public.28 The government has internalized this message as well, with the
head of EPA’s enforcement office recently acknowledging that “we should focus on greater
simplicity and clarity [in our regulations]. One of the principles we have learned over years of
26

One could easily compartmentalize the features of the regulatory process differently, even if one were to agree
with the thrust of our effort. For example, our first two categories overlap to some degree, though we think they are
sufficiently distinct to deserve separate treatment. Similarly, one could separate the carrot and stick-oriented
approaches to promoting compliance, which we have combined in our fourth component. Additionally, we have not
created a separate element to acknowledge the options for self-regulation that play an increasingly important role.
Some might break out fairness as a separate component of effective regulation. We think perceptions of fairness (or
lack thereof) in terms of the distributional effects of regulation affect regulatory legitimacy, and we therefore treat
fairness as an aspect of legitimacy. Finally, achieving desired results is obviously one of the indicia of effectiveness.
Our typology is intended to provide a big picture sense of different key components of an effective regulatory
process. We believe our framework for integrating the contextual challenges discussed in Part IC into the design of
enforcement and compliance programs would remain valuable even if one were to define the key components of
effective regulation differently than we have.
27 See, e.g., Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that a “range of activities contributes to compliance . .
. , including drafting regulations that are enforceable . . .” and further noting that “enforceability” “depends on a
number of factors, including clear language and definitions . . .”).
28
At the far end of the continuum are cases such as General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir.
1995), in which the D.C. Circuit rejected an EPA enforcement action because EPA’s rules did not provide
sufficiently clear norms. Probably more typically, lack of clarity leads to delays and increases in transaction costs,
and may discourage socially worthwhile activity. See Angela Morrison Uhland, Improving Regulations for
Biomass-Based Electrical Generating Facilities, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15 (2008). The more likely the
possible enforcement, and the more burdensome any sanctions assessed would be, the more likely indeterminacy
will have these effects.
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hard experience is that compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear.”29 This message
is most obviously salient for the development of regulations,30 but it is also important in the
development of guidance and the exercise of enforcement discretion.31
Achieving or pursuing clarity requires attention during multiple stages of the regulatory
process. An obvious starting point is the regulatory norms themselves. A second important
aspect of clarity, however, involves education, especially education of the regulated community.
Studies have shown that taking the extra effort to educate regulated parties about their legal
obligations can pay significant dividends in terms of improved compliance. A recent Colorado
compliance initiative involving hazardous waste rules, for example, found that an innovative
state effort to increase understanding of regulatory requirements led to significant improvements
in compliance, thereby dramatically reducing the need for enforcement.32
Clarity, however, also may come at a cost. Statutory and regulatory schemes often cover
a large number of actors, and not all are situated similarly. Thus, choices often need to be made
about whether to use one-size-fits-all approaches or, alternatively, to tailor treatment of different
sub-groups within the regulated community. In some situations it is possible to use fairly bright
lines for such tailoring. RCRA’s use of thresholds to distinguish between standard generators
and de minimis generators is an example.33 Sometimes, however, efforts to regulate “fairly”
29

Giles, supra note 24, at 24. See also Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,517,
54,521 (proposed Sept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (highlighting the value of “clear regulatory
requirements” and transparency in promoting water quality protection). Certainty can also help the government
perform its responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CLEAN WATER ACT ACTION PLAN at 4 (2009) [hereinafter, EPA, CWAP] (noting that
EPA’s challenges in protecting water quality have been increased by judicial decisions concerning the scope of the
CWA’s coverage because the “confusion and uncertainty” they created “have negatively impacted EPA’s ability to
enforce by significantly increasing the amount of time and resources it takes to bring enforcement actions”).
Professor Craig, addressing this uncertainty, argues that “[l]egal clarity, certainty, and uniformity are recognized
rule-of-law values, particularly when the law seeks to regulate private conduct.” Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies
Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1,
5 (2011).
30
See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 45, 89 (2012) (citing research that “demonstrates that certainty in statutory or regulatory mandates
increases the likelihood of compliance”).
31
For an interesting case study, see Melissa K. Scanlan & Stephanie Tai, Marginalized Monitoring: Adaptively
Managing Urban Stormwater, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013). See also Elizabeth Glass Geltman &
Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1998) (urging creation of a “no action” process in which EPA would provide facility-specific
guidance “so that it gives industry a higher degree of certainty than the EPA’s existing guidance documents and
policy letters”); Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then Some), 55 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1151, 1156 (2007) (arguing that greater clarity in regulatory guidance may be more effective than higher
penalties in reducing undesirable activities concerning health care insurance); cf. Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering
Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 F.S.U. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2014)
(arguing that “not all uncertainty is created equal”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294056.
32
Schieffelin, et al., supra note 15; U.S., EPA Increasing Understanding of Environmental Requirements is the
Heart of EPA Assistance (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/assistance/08cafactsheet.pdf (describing successful education
programs which reduced emissions from paint stripping and coating operations and partnerships between EPA and
states to increase understanding of industry best waste management practices); U.S. EPA, The National Nitrate
Compliance Initiative (2002) (describing a compliance assistance initiative involving the metal finishing sector).
33 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (describing conditional exemption for small quantity waste generators).
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require much more ad hoc judgments about whether particular members of the regulated
community qualify for special treatment. Especially in the latter situations, where there are no
bright line rules or tests, there is a clear tension between clarity and “fair” treatment.34
Regardless of the precise weight policy makers and others attach to clarity as a
component of effective regulation in a particular context, it seems relatively uncontested that
clarity of norms and expectations is a factor that at a minimum deserves attention in regulatory
design.35
2. Achievability
A second key component of effective regulation is implementability or achievability of
requirements. Using EPA’s terminology, achievability involves the extent to which strategies
“will work in the real world – rules with compliance built in.”36 A recent example of EPA’s
emphasis on achievability in developing a particular regulatory regime relates to the agency’s
proposal of emission control regulations for oil and gas producers under the Clean Air Act
(CAA). EPA adopted the strategy of allowing producers simply to inform EPA that they are
using air pollution control equipment that EPA has certified rather than testing the equipment
themselves. EPA explained that its purpose in using this approach was to “make compliance
easier and less costly, while improving results . . . .”37
Achievability has not always trumped other values in policy design. Congress has
insisted that regulatory standards be set with little if any attention given to achievability because
of the weight it attached to other values, such as attaining a particular level of health or
environmental protection. In the environmental laws, for example, Congress in some cases has
directed EPA not to consider costs in developing regulatory standards.38 In other regulatory
schemes, Congress did not prohibit consideration of cost, but nevertheless made it clear that it
was permissible for EPA to attach relatively little weight to it, and apply a relatively loose
definition of achievability.39 At least in some contexts, technology-forcing regulatory

34

Some of the waiver provisions under the CWA are examples of regulation that require ad hoc judgments. On the
potential benefits of making case-by-case adjustments to regulations after adoption, including through the
enforcement process, see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation through Incremental
Adjustment, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004).
35 The rule of lenity is a canon of construction that highlights the value courts have attached to clarity,
particularly in criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). See also Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (highlighting the benefits of a bright line rule which provides “clear and
unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession”).
36
Giles, supra note 24, at 23. For arguments in favor of pragmatic regulatory approaches, see SHAPIRO &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 17. There is obviously an overlap between this second attribute and certainty in that clear
rules may be easier to achieve than unclear ones.
37
Giles, supra note 24, at 23. We do not mean to suggest that self-reporting without agency oversight would
necessarily be appropriate. See, e.g., Schieffelin et al., supra note 15 (noting that self-reporting in tandem with
agency oversight helped to improve compliance).
38
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the CAA prohibits EPA from
considering cost in setting national ambient air quality standards).
39
E.g., Ass’n of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that Congress
adopted stringent technology-based regulations that might put some regulated sources out of business); Union Elec.
Co v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 260 (1976) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 2-3 (1970)) (“Therefore, the Committee
determined that existing sources of [air] pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.”).
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approaches have been used successfully to substantially improve normatively-desired outcomes
notwithstanding questions at the outset about the achievability of such approaches.40
Beyond the scope of any particular regime, scholars have debated the value of including
hortatory language in environmental statutes because of the gap between objectives and likely
results. Some suggest that setting the bar high has had a positive influence on performance.41
Others have been more skeptical.42 Regardless of the weight that should be attached to
achievability in the design of any particular regulatory regime, the larger, conceptual point is that
it is important to consider the extent to which regulated parties are likely to be able to achieve
regulatory standards in development of regulatory approaches.
3.

Verifiability

A third key component of effective regulation and of strategies to induce compliance
involves what we term “verifiability.” We define verifiability as the capacity to monitor
compliance with regulatory requirements. There is little question that the ability to monitor
compliance with legal requirements is a critical component of effective regulation.43
The major federal environmental regulatory statutes generally provide broad monitoring
authority that includes, at a minimum, authority for the government to inspect an operation’s
40

Technology-forcing regulation has long been an accepted and important tool for achieving environmental goals.
Aspirational regulations have prompted technological developments that facilitated improved performance,
sometimes in the face of infeasibility claims. See Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in
Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (1994); Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance
to Climate Change: A Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (David M.
Driesen ed., The MIT Press 2010); Daniel P. Selmi, Impacts of Air Quality Regulation on Economic Development,
13-Fall NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 382, 386 (1998) (“In the past, claims that the pollution control technology is
impossible to achieve have collapsed when one manufacturer announced that it was able to comply.”).
41 See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and
Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 150 (2004) (noting that many environmental laws with
aspirational objectives “have arguably forced much beneficial technological and social change”).
42
Compare John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 300 (1990) (“Symbolic
legislation is not a set of specific instructions for the agency to follow, but a statement of legislative aspirations and
assurances delivered to various constituencies as well as the agency.”); Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable
Portfolio Standards and Feed-in Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 326-27 (2012) (raising possibility that
renewable portfolio standards have operated as “political subterfuges: symbolic legislation adopted to garner
electoral favor but intended to accomplish very little in actuality”); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 446-58 (1999), with
Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 119 (2006) (noting the instrumental value of symbolic legislation, which can “function as a
‘thumb on the scale’ in favor of more rather than less pollution control. [Such] symbolism, though imperfect, is a
rational legislative approach to states’ and industries' persistent resistance to cleaning the air.”).
43
See, e.g., Auditor General Report, supra note 1, at 9-10; U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, The EPA Should
Improve Monitoring of Controls in the Renewable Fuel Standard Program 6 (2013), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/20130905-13-P-0373.pdf (recommending additional monitoring to verify that
participants comply with regulations and to avoid fraud cases); U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs
to Direct More Attention, Efforts, and Funding to Enhance its Speciation Monitoring Program for Measuring Fine
Particulate Matter, 3 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050207-2005-P-00004.pdf
(describing the EPA’s speciation monitoring network as a “critical component” for developing control strategies);
U.S. GAO, Environmental Enforcement: EPA Cannot Ensure the Accuracy of Self-Reported Compliance
Monitoring Data 15 (1993), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-93-21 (describing an initiative to
identify hazardous waste programs operating without self-reporting as vital to the integrity of the regulatory system).
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compliance with regulatory requirements as well as an obligation for the regulated party to
monitor its own performance.44 Yet, monitoring schemes come in various shapes and sizes.45
One of us was involved many years ago in establishing a statewide strategy that sought to
enhance verifiability by requiring facilities with especially significant compliance concerns to
hire independent third-party monitors whose role was to complement both government
inspection efforts and the facility’s own compliance efforts.46
As a practical matter the nature and extent of monitoring that occurs is likely to depend
on a variety of features of the particular regulatory regime involved, including the availability of
government resources; the complexity associated with monitoring compliance and the training
required to monitor credibly; the availability, cost, and reliability of monitoring equipment; the
trustworthiness of regulated parties and their commitment to self-monitoring; and the capacity of
non-governmental interests to participate in monitoring.
Some commentators have highlighted the importance of broader transparency to the
public as an aspect of verifiability.47 Transparency can be enhanced in a variety of ways. For
example, the Clean Water Act requires permittees to submit discharge monitoring reports
(DMRs) that demonstrate (non-)compliance with legal requirements and requires that these
DMRs be easily accessible to interested citizens. The transparency of the CWA in revealing
non-compliance is a principal reason most of the citizen suit activity against alleged violators of
the major environmental laws has occurred under that statute.48 Other reporting requirements,

44

E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414 (CAA).
45
Monitoring can take several forms, such as the requirement that regulated entities file periodic discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs), as under the CWA, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2 (defining DMRs), 122.41(l)(4)(i), or the
obligation for industrial facilities to report annual chemical releases under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act. See U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory Program, available at http://www2.epa.gov/toxicsrelease-inventory-tri-program. DMRs are compliance-based, while chemical release forms are not strictly so but can
indirectly assist environmental performance generally and compliance in particular. Verifiability tools vary in their
degree of transparency.
46
See David L. Markell, States and Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in
the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 408 (1994). Other
approaches include reward systems, U.S. EPA, Performance Track Program Guide 2 (Sept. 2005); compliance
incentives, U.S. EPA, Operating Principles for an Integrated Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program 8
(Interim Final Nov. 18, 1996); and spotlighting and information dissemination, Cass Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA L. REV. 613, 616 (1999).
47
See David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2005) [hereinafter Markell, Slack] (discussing increases in transparency and
public involvement). EPA’s view is that “[p]ublic disclosure is [an] underutilized tool: there is powerful evidence
that publishing information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by customers,
neighbors, investors, and insurers.” Giles, supra note 24, at 24. Further, Giles indicates that transparency may serve
a “reminder function” by drawing attention to problems and inducing senior-level officials to fix them. Id.
Transparency also may bring community pressure to bear on lower performing parties and alert investors and
insurers in ways that provide financial motivation to improve performance. Id. at 25-26.
48
See, e.g., James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV.
1, 2 (2003) (noting that most environmental citizen suits between 1978 and 1983 were filed under the CWA,
although suits were distributed more evenly in later years); William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement:
Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 PACE ENVT L. REV. 67, 75 (2007) [hereinafter Andreen,
Motivating Enforcement] (reporting that environmental NGOs brought hundreds of CWA cases during the Reagan
administration when federal enforcement flagged).
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such as those for hazardous substance releases above a reportable quantity,49 or pursuant to
EPA’s toxics release inventory (TRI) program,50 are useful for monitoring and verifying
compliance with legal requirements while also serving other purposes.51
Considerable evidence shows that in many circumstances inadequate verification
contributes to lower-than-desired levels of compliance with environmental requirements. To
offer an example from the sphere of international environmental law, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism has suffered from weak verifiability, which has undermined the
effectiveness of the Mechanism.52 The Canadian Auditor General similarly found that
monitoring shortcomings weakened the enforcement and compliance performance of a Canadian
environmental program.53 On the other hand, enhanced reporting has led to dramatically
improved compliance in some cases. In a recent article, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement highlighted a 2008 study in Massachusetts that found that drinking water systems
required to mail compliance information to customers reduced both violations and severe health
violations significantly as a result.54 She noted that “EPA’s efforts to make our data more
available are only starting to scratch the surface of the ways transparency can improve results.”55
In short, while the optimal parameters for incorporating a verification component into a
particular regulatory regime will depend on a wide variety of factors, the literature demonstrates
that verification is a foundational element of an effective regulatory scheme.
4. The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions
A fourth component of an effective regulatory scheme is its capacity to incentivize
regulated parties to comply with regulatory obligations through the use of both carrots and sticks.
Not every violation is worth pursuing, even in a world free of resource constraints.
Conceptually, an optimal level of compliance maximizes net social benefits.56

49

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (reporting requirement under CERCLA).
42 U.S.C. § 11023.
51
David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship,
18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 82 (1993) (citing Charles L. Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, the Right Response, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1988, at F3) (stating that the TRI program revealed the extent which companies were discharging
potentially harmful substances in both accidents and routine daily operations).
52
See, e.g., Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 109, 121 (2014) (“The CDM has suffered serious [verifiability] problems. Determining whether
emissions have actually increased is easy if you have continuous and automatic emissions monitoring that can be
verified. In a developing country where one relies upon records that may not exist, and testing technology that may
be inadequate or fraudulent, it can be difficult if not impossible.”).
53
Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 2.
54
Giles, supra note 24, at 24
55
Id. at 25-26.
56
See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental
Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 297, 316 (1999); Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630 (citing Becker, supra note 2, at 200,
as the source of “the classic account of optimal deterrence in which sanctions are set equal to the net social cost of
undesirable conduct divided by the probability of successful prosecution, such that a wrongdoer internalizes the full
social cost of her action”).
50
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EPA, on its own and in tandem with environmental or community NGOs and regulated
parties, has a rich array of options.57 These include litigation options such as criminal
prosecutions under many of the environmental statutes, civil judicial actions, and administrative
enforcement actions, some of which may, like their judicial counterparts, seek penalties and
other relief.58 Beyond these types of formal enforcement litigation, EPA uses strategies that
employ “carrots” or a mix of “carrots and sticks” to promote compliance.59 An active debate
continues about the relative effectiveness of different strategies in different contexts.60
At the ground level, EPA has developed a library full of enforcement response and
penalty policies that seek to prioritize violations that warrant different levels of enforcement
attention. 61 The agency has generally attempted to focus on “significant violations” and “high
priority” violations and give less or different types of attention to minor instances of noncompliance.62 It has also developed a substantial set of compliance promotion and incentive
policies that reflect a mix of strategies.63

57

Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to
Understand How and Why, in MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
384 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds, 2005) [hereinafter MAKING LAW WORK] (describing actions EPA can use,
including civil and criminal enforcement, penalties, injunctive relief, public notification of violations, and varying
incentives). Following up to assess whether alleged violators return to compliance is another aspect of enforcement.
Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 2.
58
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 6928 (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (CAA).
59
See Lyon, supra note 3, at 49-52 (discussing the impacts of alternative policy instruments, such as subsidies and
effluent fees); Robert Esworthy, Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They Enforced?, Congressional
Research Service Report 19 (June 18, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34384.pdf
[hereinafter Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?] (noting that EPA uses a diverse set of strategies to promote
compliance, including compliance assistance, administrative and civil enforcement, and criminal enforcement);
Envtl. Law Inst., Beyond Enforcement? Enforcement, Compliance Assistance, and Corporate Leadership Programs
in Five Midwest States (January 2003); Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (April 11, 2000). The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) experimented with an apparently successful program under which it promised less frequent
inspection of plants with poor safety records whose operators voluntarily agreed to improve working conditions and
monitor and report on their progress. A court invalidated the program, however, based on the agency’s procedural
violations in adopting it. See Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the Contracting State, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 215, 218 & n.12 (2000) (citing Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
60
Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and
Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245 (2000); Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence
and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.10523 (2000); Simpson et
al., supra note 21, at 233 (noting that scholars and policymakers know little about effectiveness of different
corporate crime-control strategies).
61
E.g., U.S. EPA, RCRA Civil Penalty Policy (June 2003), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/resourceconservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-civil-penalty-policy; Revision to Adjusted Penalty Policy Matrices Package
Issues on November 16, 2009, available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/revision-adjusted-penalty-policymatrices-package-issued-november-16-2009 ; U.S. EPA, Workbook: Timely and Appropriate Enforcement
Response to High Priority Violations (HPVs) (1999), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/workbooktimely-and-appropriate-ta-enforcement-response-high-priority-violations-hpvs. For current EPA efforts to revisit
CWA enforcement efforts, see Part III infra.
62
See, e.g., Memorandum: Revision of NPDES Significant Noncompliance (SNC) Criteria to Address Violations of
Non-Monthly Average Limits, September 21, 1995, available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/memorandumrevision-npdes-significant-noncompliance-snc-criteria-address-violations-non.; David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is
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Taking a step back conceptually from our review of the mix of tools available to promote
compliance, debate continues about the appropriate metrics for evaluating enforcement
performance. The possibilities include inputs (e.g., the extent of agency resources invested in
bringing enforcement cases), outputs (e.g., the number of enforcement actions brought),
outcomes (e.g., the amount of pollution reductions achieved through enforcement actions), and
environmental results (e.g., changes in the quality of the ambient air or water because of
enforcement activity).64 Compliance levels have been considered the holy grail by some,65 but
have proven extremely difficult to use in practice.66
5.

Legitimacy

Finally, we suggest that an important component of effective regulation is its capacity to
promote legitimacy, which we define to include enhancing confidence by the public and others.67
We believe that, in designing and implementing regulatory enforcement and compliance
mechanisms, it is appropriate for policymakers to ask questions about the effects of different
design options on public perceptions. Will a particular regulatory design enhance or diminish
public confidence in a regulatory program and the government’s ability and willingness to
promote compliance with it? A regulatory scheme that leads to a public perception that
government is corrupt, overbearing, or selective in its enforcement of the law may lead to a loss
of confidence and trust that undermines effective regulation in many ways, including by
Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (“The
EPA emphasizes cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exercise of investigative discretion.”).
63
See, e.g., EPA, Compliance Assistance, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/assistance/index.html.
64
Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Strategies for Using State Information: Measuring and Improving State Performance
20-21 (IBM Center for The Business of Government 2003) (summarizing recent emphasis on outcome indicators for
performance rather than process); National Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating Environmental Progress:
How EPA and the States Can Improve the Quality of Enforcement and Compliance Information 10 (2001) (“The
primary accountability mechanism used by Congress and EPA [for the states] has . . . been counting activities that
states provide for EPA’s media-specific databases, such as numbers of permits, inspections, enforcement actions,
and penalty dollars.”); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 119 (1995)
(noting that EPA evaluation of its enforcement work is based on numerical indicators).
65
See Markell, Slack, supra note 47, at 62 (“Many states, among other parties, have identified compliance rates as
one of the best measures (and perhaps the best measure) of enforcement performance.”).
66
Id. (noting that “the calculation of such rates in a credible way is a significant challenge”) (citing National
Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating Environmental Progress: How EPA and the States Can Improve the
Quality of Enforcement and Compliance Information 27 (2001), available at
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_ environment/environmental.pdf).
67
For efforts to raise this fifth feature of effective regulation in different contexts, see John H. Knox & David L.
Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental
Commission, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505 (2012); Hammond & Markell, supra note 5. For discussions of the difficult-todefine concept of legitimacy, see, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 466 (2012) (noting that “[l]egitimacy is a
notoriously treacherous concept.”). One way to define the term is to focus on “the acceptability of [a] regulation to
those involved in its development.” Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000). Such acceptability may hinge on the availability of opportunities for
public participation and the degree of regulatory transparency. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up
Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 59 n.345 (2011) (“Public
participation and transparency are widely considered to be the backbone of legitimacy for public agencies.”);
Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stilwell & Oran Young, What Reason Demands: Making Law Work for Sustainable
Development, in MAKING LAW WORK, supra note 57, at 42 (describing elements of good governance for sustainable
development as including anti-corruption and accountability).
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exacerbating budget pressures if public support for necessary funding diminishes.68 The
legitimacy of a regulatory system also may turn on the degree to which it protects against
deviation from legislative goals due to capture of regulators by special interests, and on whether
decisionmakers are perceived as honest, unbiased, or competent.69 Polling results showing the
American public’s loss of confidence in the federal government highlight the salience of
perception by different publics in designing the enforcement aspects of regulatory programs. 70
B.

Inter-Relatedness of the Five Components of Effective Regulation

The preceding section introduces what we believe to be five important components of
effective regulation.71 Considering each of these components on its own merits is, we submit, a
starting point in designing and implementing an effective enforcement and compliance
promotion regime. A second layer of analysis involves assessing how the relationships among
the components affect the manner in which, and the degree to which, policymakers should
pursue each individual component of effective regulation. This section focuses on the
fundamentally inter-related character of different components of the regulatory process in order
to reinforce the importance of considering regulatory design holistically rather than atomistically.
The five components of effective enforcement and compliance that we discuss above are
inter-related in a virtually unlimited number of ways. We offer a few illustrations in this section.
In 2007, Colorado’s hazardous waste program was concerned about compliance rates among
small quantity generators (SQGs) of hazardous waste.72 As backdrop, state regulators believed
that collectively, SQGs in the state might pose a greater risk to human health and the
environment than other, larger generators. This was because in the aggregate SQGs generated a
considerable amount of waste; they did so at many more locations than large quantity generators;
and the SQGs had less control over the waste and lower levels of compliance. Because of
68

Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), in which landowners challenged an EPA order requiring them to apply
for a dredge and fill permit under the CWA before developing portions of their land alleged to contain wetlands,
may be an example of lack of buy-in by some citizens to regulatory goals or means. The controversy concerning the
IRS’s purported selection bias in targeting “tea party” groups is another recent example. See Sheila Krumholz &
Robert Weinberger, The Real I.R.S. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at A27 (noting long-term damage to IRS
credibility in assessing claims of tax-exempt status that “will be difficult to undo”); Rachel E. Barkow,
Prosecutorial Discretion: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 (2013) (raising
concerns about unfettered prosecutorial discretion). See also supra note 26 (discussing fairness as a component of
legitimacy).
69 See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 29-31.
70
See e.g., Joy Wilke & Frank Newport, Fewer Americans than Ever Trust Government to Handle Problems,
GALLUP POLITICS, Sept. 13, 2013, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/164393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-govhandle-problems.aspx. Some individual agencies, including EPA, tend to poll much higher, however. At the same
time that only 19% of respondents in one poll answered that they trust the government to do what is right almost
always or most of the time, and only 23% viewed Congress favorably, 62% of respondents viewed EPA favorably.
Pew Research Center, Trust in Government Nears Record Low, but Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably
(Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-1813%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf
71 A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that “[c]ompliance with pollution control laws is
addressed through a continuum of response mechanisms, ranging from compliance assistance to administrative and
civil enforcement, to the stronger criminal enforcement.” Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 19.
In the previous section, we suggest that the continuum is even broader than the report suggests, reaching at least as
far back as the initial adoption of regulatory requirements.
72
This summary of the Colorado program is taken from Schieffelin et al, supra note 15.
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resource constraints, agency staff were only able to inspect each SQG once every eight years. In
the agency’s view, “[t]hat [was] simply not enough to improve compliance” – “[t]he 12 percent
inspection coverage we were attaining each year did not create enough accountability and
deterrence to improve compliance rates.”73
Colorado decided it needed to address the SQG sector in a different way. It adopted a
regulation that sought to improve compliance by changing the “verifiability” component and
enhancing the clarity of the regulatory requirements. In particular, Colorado required that each
SQG complete and return a “self-certification checklist” to the agency. Failure to do so
subjected a SQG to an enforcement action and the possibility of penalties. Colorado reports that
the return rate for the checklists is more than 95 percent.
Beyond tweaking the verifiability component of its regulatory scheme, Colorado also
invested considerable effort in improving the scheme’s clarity. It prepared a comprehensive
compliance checklist that identified all of the regulatory requirements, and it developed an
instruction booklet that provided guidance on how to complete each question on the checklist.
The state sent the checklist and instruction booklet to all members of the regulated community.
The changes to verifiability, sanctions, and clarity led to significant increases in
compliance. As the report on the initiative reflects, “compliance rates across the SQG sector
have dramatically improved. . . . In 2008, only 32 percent of the SQGs were in compliance with
100 percent of the regulatory requirements. . . . By 2011, this compliance rate had increased to
84 percent.”74 This example reflects the value of thinking about key components of a
compliance promotion scheme in an integrated way and happily appears to be an example of a
significant redesign that yielded impressive improvements in performance.
A second example of the value of approaching the different components of regulation in
integrated fashion is not as grounded in a real-world effort to improve environmental
compliance. In a recent article, Professor David Freeman Engstrom focuses on one aspect of
enforcement – enforcement litigation, and in particular private and public enforcement litigation
– in an effort to improve regulatory design.75 Engstrom considers whether agency “gatekeeping”
of private enforcement would help to rationalize enforcement litigation; he further considers the
possible options for designing such a gatekeeping function.
For example, Engstrom suggests that a strong agency gatekeeping role to limit or direct
private enforcement might be appropriate when there is a significant risk that private
enforcement will yield legislative drift “as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new
and democratically unaccountable directions. . . .”76 It seems reasonable to conclude that the
clearer the substantive rules that govern the conduct of regulated entities, the lower the risk that
courts, responding to suits by non-governmental organizations (NGO)s, will accept novel
applications of legal mandates that amount to such legislative drift. Under these circumstances,
all other things being equal, the need for agencies to exercise veto authority over private
enforcement efforts should recede. On the other hand, in some cases, clear requirements may
contribute to dramatic reductions in non-compliance and hence in the need for enforcement,
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 1.
Engstrom, supra note _3.
76
Id. at 637-41.
73
74
75
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private or public. The value of private enforcement may decline in such circumstances, which
might affect analysis of the desired mix of rewards and sanctions and, in particular, the
appropriateness of incorporating a private enforcement feature in a compliance program.
The ability of regulated entities to comply with regulatory norms (the achievability
component) also is salient in thinking through the desirability and structure of Engstrom’s
gatekeeping apparatus as part of a regulatory scheme’s sanctions function. If compliance is
particularly difficult, public enforcers might choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and defer
prosecution of known violations, or reduce the penalties assessed for such violations, perhaps in
return for commitments by regulated entities to sink resources into developing a fix for the
implementation problem.77 A gatekeeper regime that empowered NGOs to initiate private
enforcement actions might interfere with commitments that regulated entities might otherwise
make to public enforcers.78 In circumstances in which achievability is a concern, the arguments
in favor of a strong public gatekeeping role for private enforcement actions may be relatively
appealing.79 On the other hand, problems with achievability may create more, and more
significant, non-compliance problems that may overwhelm public enforcement capacity. The
incorporation of private enforcement litigation as a component of an enforcement regime would
seem to hold special value in such cases.80
Consideration of Professor Engstrom’s gatekeeping scenario also shows that verifiability
is not only a critical feature of regulation in its own right, but is also important because of its
effect on other components of regulatory compliance design. Easy and cheap access by private
enforcers to information revealing compliance status creates a risk of overdeterrence, at least if
one regards what Professor Engstrom refers to as the “zealousness critique” of private
enforcement as a significant concern.81 If access to information concerning compliance status is
available at little if any cost, private enforcers may pursue actions in which their expected return
on investment in litigation will exceed their own costs, even if public enforcers would choose not
to sue because the expected social cost exceeds the expected social gain. Thus, low verification

77

EPA engages in this practice frequently. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation:
Is Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1330-34 (2004) (describing EPA’s flexible and
pragmatic approach to enforcement, including reliance on investment by regulated entities in supplemental
environmental projects).
78
Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Became an
Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred
L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339
(1990).
79
See infra Part IA4 for discussion of gatekeeping as part of the mix of rewards and sanctions component of
effective regulation.
80
This was Congress’s reasoning in including a citizen suit provision in the CWA. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
81
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630-34 (suggesting that private enforcers may be overzealous because their
motivations may differ from goal of maximizing social welfare). Engstrom is not alone in identifying the hazards of
reliance on private enforcement. See, e.g., Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of
Non-State Actors in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 119 (2013) (noting concerns about private
regulatory failure, lack of accountability, and private overzealousness). As Grabosky colorfully puts it, “the sword
of citizen participation is two-edged. One would not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts.” Id. at ___. See
also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
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costs may increase the risk that public and private assessments of the relative costs and value of
enforcement diverge, resulting in over-expenditure of social resources and over-deterrence.82
The likelihood of overzealousness remains in dispute, however, and gatekeeping regimes
may be structured to minimize it (if, indeed, they are needed at all). For example, the absence of
a damage remedy for successful private enforcers under the citizen suit provisions of the federal
environmental statutes should minimize this risk. Likewise, these provisions all require that
penalties by paid to the United States Treasury, not to private enforcers.83 Further, some
scholars, such as Professor Barton Thompson, have suggested that “the benefits of citizen suits
have far outstripped the benefits that Congress originally identified,”84 even assuming that some
over-deterrence occurs, because of the potential for private enforcers to create enforcement
innovations that may be attractive to public enforcers, the promotion of democratic values that
direct citizen participation in law enforcement yields, and the educational value of citizen suits.85
The larger point still stands, however: the design of the verifiability component of effective
regulation affects how other aspects of environmental regulation should be structured, including
the appropriate mix of rewards and sanctions.
A final reflection on the inter-related character of different components of effective
environmental regulation relates to the relationship between the mix of sanctions and rewards
and legitimacy, and is again illustrated in connection with the desirability of a gatekeeping
mechanism. A regulatory design that gives a government agency extremely powerful
gatekeeping authority might undermine legitimacy if the public’s perception is that an agency is
choking off much-needed private enforcement.86 Such a loss of legitimacy is most likely to be
the case if an agency is widely perceived of as corrupt or captured; extensive opportunities for
supplemental private enforcement may help to restore a sense of legitimacy to the regulatory
program, and in particular its enforcement component. Less obviously, Professor Engstrom
discusses “bubble periods,” during which ambiguous regulatory mandates remain unsettled.87
He posits that vigorous private enforcement may be troublesome during these transitional periods
because judicial responses to private enforcement actions may be difficult to override
legislatively and enforcement targets may suffer costly adverse judgments notwithstanding
subsequent overrides. In such cases, allowing private enforcement might undermine legitimacy
in the eyes of the regulated community at a minimum. This effect would support a strong
82

See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630-31. See also Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 11, 25 (2014) (describing this problem in connection with implied private rights of action); id. at 46 (“financial
incentives may play an important role in the decision to sue, which can lead to excessive litigation and
overdeterrence”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1341 (2008) (arguing that,
under the securities laws, private enforcers’ “profit motive is inherently misaligned with the public's interest in
achieving optimal deterrence”).
83
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1319(d).
84
Thompson, supra note 23, at 198. In assessing the zealousness critique, Thompson added that evidence “suggests
that environmental nonprofits have filed a sizable number of worthwhile actions that public enforcers either
purposefully or unintentionally failed to pursue.” Id. at 203. See also id. at 206 (discounting risk of “zealousness
error” from citizen suits).
85
Thompson, supra note 23, at 188.
86
William Andreen and Sidney Shapiro each suggested this possibility in helpful comments on a draft of this article.
See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 48, at 84-85 (suggesting that some states filed a significant
number of enforcement actions only after a citizen had filed a notice of intent to sue).
87
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 640.
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gatekeeping regime.88 But if agency’s delay in filling statutory gaps is due not to the costs of
regulation but instead to agency disaffection with the statutory regime, private enforcement may
help to maintain public confidence in the rule of law. This scenario would seem to favor a weak
or nonexistent gatekeeping regime.
C.

Contextual Design Challenges

The preceding discussion identifies five key components of effective regulation. In
addition, it demonstrates that effective design must consider each component as it relates to the
others, rather than solely as a distinct and isolated regulatory feature. The following section
discusses four contextual issues facing policymakers responsible for regulatory design, which
may enrich, and complicate, analysis of how best to craft a program that settles on the best mix
of the five components of effective regulation addressed above.89 These four contextual design
issues are the hybrid character of much of contemporary governance; the need to confront actual
performance; the dynamic nature of governance challenges and opportunities; and salience, the
need to prioritize in making design and implementation decisions.90 We list these elements in
Table 2.
Table 2 – Key Design Elements
Hybrid Character of Governance
Reality checking in terms of past performance and future challenges
and opportunities
Dynamic Character
Salience – the need to Prioritize

Figure 1 depicts how the five components of effective regulation described in section A
interact with these four contextual design challenges.
[Figure 1 to be added; it will show the interconnectedness of the five components and four
contextual design challenges]
In short, as Figure 1 shows, each of the contextual design challenges has the potential to affect
one or more components of effective enforcement and compliance promotion. As a result, it is
the interaction of the contextual design challenges and the components of effective regulation

88
89

Id. at 639-40.
As is true for virtually all efforts to capture reality through categories, the identity and parameters of the categories
are open to question.
90
We do not claim that these four contextual issues are the only ones relevant to the design of effective enforcement
and compliance programs. We believe all four are important to consider, however, in thinking about possible
enforcement and compliance promotion options.
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that should shape the design of each component of an enforcement and compliance program such
as gatekeeping mechanisms.91 The remainder of this section elaborates on these interactions.
1. Hybrid Governance
One contextual reality of contemporary governance in the United States is its hybrid
character. At its most abstract level, we view hybrid government to mean governance “formed
or composed of heterogeneous elements.”92 Several manifestations of the hybrid character of
governance are well known and we mention them only briefly. In terms of horizontal hybrid
governance issues, both the U.S. Constitution and the foundational statute for the administrative
state, the Administrative Procedure Act, reserve specific roles for the three branches of our
federal government.93 The ongoing debate about the appropriate role for the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
highlights the tension concerning the distribution of power between and among Congress, the
President, and federal agencies.94 The lack of judicial review of much of what OIRA does raises
issues concerning the appropriate role of the judicial branch in presidential review of agency
activities as well. More generally, increasing recognition that multiple federal agencies need to
be engaged in addressing many of the most significant public policy issues we face today reflects
that horizontal coordination challenges exist within, between, and among agencies. These
challenges pose a significant barrier to effective governance.95
The cooperative federalism structure Congress adopted in enacting the major federal
pollution control statutes contributes to the hybrid character of contemporary enforcement and
compliance work by giving states a major role in administrative governance. An enormous
scholarship addresses the vertical governance challenges the cooperative federalism structure
poses, including in the enforcement and compliance realm.96 Over the past few years, EPA has
acknowledged these challenges and announced renewed efforts to grapple with them more
effectively.97 The states’ central role in the enforcement and compliance promotion function has
heavily influenced the design of EPA’s programs; this will no doubt continue to be the case for
the indefinite future.
Governance is much more than simply the actions of government actors, however, and
the quality of governance often benefits (or suffers) from the actions of these multiple
91

Professor Engstrom’s focus on rationalization of private and public enforcement litigation as a central challenge
of administrative governance illustrates the importance of our first contextual design challenge, hybrid governance.
Engstrom, supra note 3.
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http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hybrid.
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U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (empowering reviewing courts to hold agencies accountable by
invalidating actions that are in excess of statutory authority).
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See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1838 (2013); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097
(2006).
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Climate change adaptation is a prominent example. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117,
52,124 (Oct. 5, 2009); and Exec. Order No. 13653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,823 (Nov. 1, 2013) (directing agencies
to participate in task force to coordinate action on climate preparedness and resilience.). See also Camacho &
Glicksman, supra note 5; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131 (2012).
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For a sampling of this literature, see the sources cited in Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 21 n.6.
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See infra Part III.
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stakeholders.98 The value in assessing alternative regulatory design options, not only to
acknowledge the reality, but also to assess both the promise and perils of different variations of
hybrid governance, is difficult to overstate. In part this is because of the recognition that
government cannot “solve” problems on its own and that a well-designed “pluralistic regulatory
landscape” improves chances for success.99 As Professor Magali Delmas has noted, “the
inadequacy of governments to resolve some environmental issues has generated the search for
alternative governance mechanisms.”100
Considerable work engaging the appropriate shape of this pluralistic regulatory landscape
has been done, such as contributions to the “new governance” literature.101 But as Professor
Delmas points out, a great deal of additional work is needed: “the research on environmental
governance without government, or between government and other actors, is only just
emerging.”102 Contextualized treatment of this pluralistic landscape is in our view likely to be of
especial importance and practical value.103 To illustrate its value, we offer such contextualized
treatment of one example of hybrid governance, the use of agency gatekeeping to rationalize
public and private enforcement litigation, a topic considered recently by Professor Engstrom.
EPA already has significant gatekeeping authority, as Professor Engstrom notes.104 We
consider here how EPA’s exercise of this authority might influence the capacities of public and
private enforcers and affect environmental regulatory enforcement and compliance. All other
things being equal, EPA would seemingly want to exercise its gatekeeping power lightly in order
to encourage private enforcement litigation in circumstances in which other strategies for
inducing compliance, such as reliance on positive incentives, do not yield desired results. Indeed,
in addition to exercising its gatekeeping responsibilities with a light touch, EPA might want to
engage private enforcers affirmatively to encourage invigorated private enforcement efforts.
Similarly, an agency posture of weak gatekeeping might be desirable where obstacles (such as
limited government enforcement resources) exist to traditional government deterrence-based
enforcement.105 In other words, an agency may opt for relatively weak gatekeeping when limited
government capacity exists.
98

See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 ILL. L. REV. 1 (defining
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Conversely, EPA may want to exercise its gatekeeping authority aggressively if it is
concerned that expansive private enforcement will undermine national consistency in
approaching compliance challenges.106 For example, private enforcement efforts that focus on
securing particular types of relief with which an agency has concerns, in lieu of the types of
relief it favors, may influence the desirability of a significant private enforcement presence107
because of both legislative fidelity and coordination issues, to use Professor Engstrom’s terms.108
Professor Engstrom’s focus on agency gatekeeping as a mechanism to take advantage of
the hybrid character of enforcement litigation gives little attention to another key actor, state
agencies. The cooperative federalism structure of the environmental laws, and the central role of
the states in enforcement, is an important part of the discussion in attempting to rationalize
public and private enforcement of those laws.109 Thus, state capacity (in terms of resources and
will) in bringing enforcement actions is an important issue in assessing the need for and
desirability of EPA’s exercise of its gatekeeping authority.
We also think it is important in rationalizing enforcement litigation to be aware that a
state, like EPA, can prevent the filing of a citizen suit by commencing and “diligently
prosecuting” its own enforcement action after being notified by a prospective citizen suit
plaintiff that it intends to file suit against an alleged violator.110 Complaints have been made
citizen suit provision analogous to those in many federal pollution statutes to supplement the government’s
inadequate enforcement initiatives under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678,
that has resulted, among other things, from a shortage of inspectors. See Martha McCluskey et al., The Next OSHA:
Progressive Reforms to Empower Workers, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 4-5 (July 2012), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Next_Generation_OSHA_1207.pdf. Others have urged the addition of
citizen suit provisions to other statutes, such as those dealing with food labeling, to redress perceived government
enforcement shortcomings. See, e.g., James Springer, The Success of the Citizen Suit: Protecting Consumers from
Inaccurate Food Labeling by Amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401
(2013).
106
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over the years that some states have reacted to citizen suit notices by commencing an
enforcement action against the putative civil suit defendant and then settling the action on terms
favorable to the regulated entity because that entity was important to the state’s economy or had
valuable political connections.111 EPA has the authority, and responsibility, to exercise a
different type of gatekeeping authority when it learns of state action that may undermine
effective enforcement – here, the federal gatekeeping authority involves EPA’s authority to
withdraw a state’s authorization.112 Effective enforcement to address significant violations under
the environmental laws is a three-legged stool, with each leg (federal, state, and private
enforcement) having multiple pieces. EPA actually has at least two types of gatekeeping
authority available to rationalize the use of enforcement tools given the multiple actors involved.
While we have devoted a few pages to the particular context of agency gatekeeping of
private enforcement litigation in an effort to illustrate the importance of considering the hybrid
character of enforcement and compliance contextually, a final point about the hybrid character of
this realm is that the range of actors involved in such governance obviously extends far beyond
agency and private enforcers. Similarly, the opportunities for hybrid governance to promote
effective compliance and enforcement extend far beyond the realm of ex post enforcement
litigation.113 A critical observation about this central feature of contemporary governance is that
efforts to enhance compliance should take into account how best to engage all stakeholders
throughout the entire regulatory process.114
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114
It is worthwhile to consider the roles that NGOs of all stripes play today in each of our five components of
effective regulation. See Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 1 (listing federal, state, tribal, and
local governments, regulated parties, courts, interest groups, and the general public as relevant stakeholders). For
discussion of the roles of NGOs during different parts of the regulatory process, see, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Katherine
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Toxic Air Emission Standards, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 151 (2011) (suggesting that the predominance of certain stakeholders may skew the regulatory
process in unanticipated ways that frustrate regulatory goals, and concluding that “at least some publicly important
rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regulated parties, with little to no
counterpressure from the public interest”); Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 14. See also EPAOECA, Report on Environmental Violation, http://www.epa.gov/tips (discussing an initiative, entitled the “National
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2.

“Reality Checks” as a Contextual Design Issue

A second type of contextual issue relevant to the design of regulatory enforcement
structures is what we term the “reality check” feature. In assessing or revisiting regulatory
design, it is critical to assess the agency’s (here EPA’s) actual performance in conducting
enforcement, the challenges the agency has faced, and opportunities to improve performance by
altering regulatory features or practices in ways suggested by past experience. As we discuss in
more detail in Parts II and III below, EPA has experienced and acknowledged significant
shortcomings in its enforcement and compliance program. There are opportunities to improve on
this track record with respect to each of the five components of effective regulation identified
above,115 as well as significant challenges in doing so.
3.

Dynamism

The degree of dynamism is a third contextual issue relevant to regulatory design. This
feature does not receive much attention in some of the regulatory design literature,116 but we
believe it deserves emphasis. Effective regulatory design requires an understanding of the extent
to which key features of regulation are likely to be static or dynamic over time. This feature
differs from the reality check feature in that it focuses not on whether existing regulatory
practices have worked as anticipated, but on whether the regulatory environment itself has
shifted in ways that affect regulatory goals.
Concerns that climate change is causing transformative shifts in the environment are
becoming more widespread. Scholars and others are beginning to consider the impacts of such
changes on not only the content of regulation, but also on regulatory structure. For example,
Professors Robin Craig and J.B. Ruhl recently suggested that the impacts of climate change
warrant a fundamental reappraisal of the structure of agency procedures. In particular, they
urged more attention be given to adaptive approaches to governance rather than what they
consider to be unavoidably limited ex ante approaches:
The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions,
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes
differentiating between the “front end” and the “back end” of decisionmaking much less
relevant. Rather than make one grand decision and move on, agencies employing
adaptive management engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following a
structured, multistep protocol: (1) definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals
and objectives for management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management
actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).117

Report a Violation” website, which was designed to encourage citizens to report potential environmental violations
to promote verifiability); Hammond & Markell, supra note 5 (noting that citizens may file petitions with EPA
asserting that a state is not effectively enforcing its environmental laws, prompting EPA to investigate potential
shortcomings).
115
See supra Part IA.
116
See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 3.
117 Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 7.
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In addition, changes in agency staffing levels and financial resources, improvements in
monitoring technology, and the capacity of regulated parties and NGOs to participate in
regulatory implementation are among a litany of factors that affect EPA’s capacity for effective
governance, especially as it pertains to enforcement and compliance.118 EPA should consider
these changes in formulating and implementing approaches to achieving desired levels of
enforcement and compliance more generally. EPA is already taking steps to do so. For
example, to address compliance challenges EPA is increasingly relying heavily on new
monitoring tools and data management capabilities. These include infrared cameras that can
detect pollution emissions otherwise invisible to the naked eye and electronic reporting such as
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool that are intended to save time and money, increase
transparency, and ultimately yield improved compliance.119
Thus, the contextual reality of dynamism suggests that an indispensable component of
regulatory design is awareness of the likelihood that normative objectives may change over time.
It is also important to consider the shifting capabilities and interests of different key actors
throughout the entire regulatory enterprise and the extent to which these developments should
influence design of regulatory structures.120
4.

Salience

A final part of the regulatory design puzzle is the importance of salience. In a world of
limited resources, policymakers interested in regulatory design to improve compliance should
prioritize changing certain aspects of the regulatory process more than others.121 Informed
deliberation about possible redesign of agency governance strategies requires attention to the
nature and priority of the challenges an agency faces. It also requires consideration of all of the
opportunities available to improve performance.
To return to Professor Engstrom’s effort to rationalize integration of private enforcers
into the public compliance promotion effort, the possibility of and parameters for agency
gatekeeping is likely to be a salient issue in many contexts (environmental and otherwise) in the
118

The full array of ways in which the regulatory environment may shift is beyond the scope of this article. A rich
literature investigates how regulated parties are motivated by different factors, including utilitarian considerations,
cultural norms, and habits. It is worth considering all of these sources of motivation, and how they may shift over
time, in regulatory design. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 9, 223; Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Amanda P. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV.
715 (2011); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the
Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003); Neil Gunningham, Robert
A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).
119
Giles, supra note 24, at 24-25.
120
The contextual design challenges we have identified may affect each other. Approaches such as “new
governance” approaches are typically dynamic, for example. See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note 81, at ___ (suggesting
that the increased role of NGOs stems partly from a retreat by government that has created a regulatory vacuum).
Grabosky suggests that “regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational interactions between institutions are
often complex.” Id. at 116. Some, including Engstrom, favor orchestration of different actors, while others “may
see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as inevitable.” Id. at 115-16.
121
As indicated in Part III, prioritization is an important feature of EPA’s ongoing effort to reinvent its CWA
enforcement approach. Prioritization based on risk is also an important feature of Canada’s effort, especially given
increasing demands and limited resources. Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 9.
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effort to improve regulatory compliance. It seems indisputable, at least to us, however, that an
agency’s first step when confronting an enforcement challenge should not be to automatically
focus on any single component of the regulatory scheme, such as the appropriate structure of an
agency gatekeeping regime.122 This is a well-understood concept: while hammers work well for
nails, other tools are better for other circumstances. Before moving forward to address a
particular enforcement or compliance challenge, an agency should be sure it considers the five
key components of environmental enforcement and compliance outlined in Part IA and the
contextual design issues addressed in this section to assess which mix of viable options is likely
to prove most effective.
In the Colorado hazardous waste initiative we discuss above,123 for example, a state
agency made a judgment to prioritize promoting compliance in a particular sector of the
regulated community because of features of that community (e.g., high levels of noncompliance,
significant aggregate volumes of waste generated). The agency was then able to make
significant improvements in its regulatory approach by refining a few of our key components of
effective regulation, notably clarity, verifiability, and the mix of sanctions for noncompliance.
There was little need to consider rationalization of public and private enforcement litigation as
part of this redesign. The Colorado example obviously does not mean that the particular
strategies used there to improve clarity and verification and, ultimately, compliance, should be
used across the board. Other noncompliance challenges will require different responses to yield
desired results. Ultimately, agencies would be well-advised to engage in priority-setting on
multiple levels when addressing enforcement and compliance concerns. A first level involves
identifying the challenges that most need attention. The second involves identifying the mix of
tools that is most likely to be effective. We suggest that both the components of regulation and
contextual design issues discussed in this Part offer a starting point for taking this second step in
a systematic and thoughtful way.124
II.
Contextualizing the Conceptual Framework for Effective Regulatory Compliance Design:
An Overview of EPA’s Compliance Track Record and Challenges
As Part I indicates, informed regulatory design requires an understanding of the entire
regulatory process and of the actors who play critical roles throughout that process, whether the
goal is the design of a regulatory scheme writ large, or of a particular piece of that scheme such
as the enforcement and compliance promotion function. We now turn to a brief review of some
of the real-world compliance-related challenges and opportunities EPA faces to illustrate the
importance of context in regulatory design. In doing so, we focus on the second and third design
challenges introduced in Part IC – the need to consider an agency’s experience based on past
performance of the regulatory structures being assessed for possible revision and the ways in
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We are not suggesting that Professor Engstrom would urge that such a first step focus on gatekeeping or any
other particular component of the enforcement process. Our discussion in the text is intended to provide a wide lens
for considering the value of scholarship that offers a more particularized focus on a single regulatory design
mechanism, such as Professor Engstrom’s consideration of agency gatekeeping strategies.
123 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
124
Others have pointed to the challenges facing agencies in the enforcement and compliance realm. See Esworthy,
How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that policymakers must determine “how to balance punishment
and deterrence through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive approaches, self-auditing or correction, and
voluntary compliance”).
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which the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment bears on regulatory design, particularly
of effective enforcement and compliance structures.
Evaluating effectiveness in inducing compliance is an extraordinarily difficult task.125 It
is worth being mindful of the old adage about optimists seeing the glass half full and pessimists
seeing the same glass as half empty in considering EPA’s performance and appraisals of its
enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, a wide variety of observers, inside and outside government,
have identified significant concerns over EPA efforts to promote compliance. EPA faces
substantial barriers in overcoming these challenges, including resource constraints (its own and
those of the states), and a changing (in some cases expanding) regulated community. There are,
however, some promising signs on the regulatory design horizon as well.
The salient point about the contextual overview we provide in this Part is that extant and
upcoming challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, demonstrate that efforts to improve
regulatory design should proceed with an understanding of the nature of the challenges an
agency has faced and will face and the tools available to meet those challenges. For example,
concerns that a regulatory design that enables private enforcement suits will lead to problems
with private enforcement such as overzealousness, coordination challenges, or infidelity to
legislative objectives are likely to be fairly minor in a context in which there is rampant
noncompliance, violations are causing significant environmental degradation and harm to public
health, and responsible agencies have proved incapable of or unwilling to enforce against
substantial numbers of significant violators. On the other hand, such concerns are likely to be
much more relevant when compliance challenges are complex and require sophisticated,
integrated strategies, and a responsible agency’s efforts to address these challenges efficiently
and effectively are likely to be undermined by the presence of a host of other erstwhile enforcers.
A.

Agency Enforcement Records

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), EPA’s Office of Inspector General
(OIG), EPA’s Administrator, and EPA’s own enforcement office have all offered highly critical
assessments of EPA’s performance in promoting compliance with environmental regulatory
125

Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 5, 40 (noting that “how best to measure the success and
effectiveness of enforcement” is an issue of continuing interest and that evaluating and measuring the effectiveness
of enforcement and compliance activities “can be quite complicated”). EPA acknowledged this reality recently in a
draft strategy for improving oversight of state enforcement. U.S. EPA, National Strategy for Improving Oversight
of State Enforcement Performance 2-3 (Aug. 27, 2013 draft) [hereinafter EPA, Improving Oversight], available at
http://environblog.jenner.com/files/national-strategy-for-improving-oversight-of-state-enforcement-performance.pdf
(link provided in Steven M. Siros, EPA Proposes Increased Oversight Of State Enforcement Activities (Oct. 18,
2013), available at http://environblog.jenner.com/corporate_environmental_l/2013/10/epa-proposes-increasedoversight-over-state-enforcement-activities.html) (noting complexity of measuring state enforcement and that EPA’s
data are incomplete in part because its current metrics are based on activities states perform, rather than compliance
levels within regulated sectors, which are difficult to determine). There is an extensive measurement literature. The
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), in its various manifestations, seeks to focus on results and their
measurement. See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative
and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (April 14, 2001), M-11-17, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-17.pdf; U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides Important Opportunities to
Address Government Challenges (May 10, 2011, GAO-11-617T), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO11-617T.
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requirements.126 In a December 2012 report, for example, the GAO noted that “[i]n recent years,
EPA has reported that it is not achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it
expected in regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of noncompliance in some
programs.”127 Compounding the challenge in inducing compliance at desired levels is the
enforcers’ ignorance of the scope of the problem they are addressing. As the GAO also noted,
“because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, such as the
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under the CWA],
EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ compliance.”128 Scholars also have noted
EPA’s failure to require regulated entities to submit the kinds of information needed for accurate
agency assessment of compliance status.129
Concerns about government enforcement extend beyond EPA’s performance. An
essential feature of many of the key environmental regulatory statutes is their reliance on a
cooperative federalism structure. Congress has enacted pollution control laws such as the CAA
and CWA, charging EPA with ultimate responsibility for implementing these laws and achieving
their goals (through actions that include standard-setting, review of state-issued permits, and
concurrent enforcement authority). It has also empowered qualified and interested states,
however, to play a significant role in implementation, through planning, permitting, and
enforcement, under laws states adopt for that purpose.130 It has done so, among other reasons,
out of respect for state sovereignty, especially in areas of traditional state concern,131 to take
advantage of state expertise about local conditions, to support the legitimacy of environmental
regulation, and to enhance the total resources available to tackle environmental problems.132
Over the years, EPA has authorized increasing numbers of states to take primary responsibility
for implementation of the major environmental laws, and the states are regarded as the primary
enforcers under the major federal environmental regulatory statutes.133 As a result, much of the
126

For a recent collection of some of the reviews, see Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note 59, at 2-4.
See infra Part III for additional discussion of concerns about EPA’s enforcement record.
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U.S. Government Accountability Office, EPA Should Develop a Strategic Plan for Its New Compliance
Initiative, GAO-13-115, at 1-2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf [hereinafter
GAO, Strategic Plan].
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Id. at 1-2.
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See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321,
1348-49 (2010) (data inadequacies concerning regulatory requirements for toxic air pollutant emissions).
130
EPA has the opportunity to play a significant role even if a state is authorized to implement a program. For a
description of cooperative federalism under federal environmental statutes, see generally Robert L. Glicksman,
From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006). Not all of the federal environmental statutes are built on a cooperative federalism
foundation. Statutes such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, and the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697, for example, are not.
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See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . .”). See also 42 U.S.C. §
7401(a)(3) (concerning air pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (concerning solid waste management).
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See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 90 (2011); William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse
Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 23, 35-37 (2009) (“Empowering state and local governments to play their own supplementary roles in
enforcing the law could be the equivalent of additional cops on the beat.”).
133
See McAllister, supra note 113, at 21 (“In many regulatory programs, states have the primary responsibility for
enforcement and are overburdened.”); RECHTSCHAFFEN &. MARKELL, supra note 5, at 43 (“Congress established a
‘cooperative federalism’ structure that makes EPA ultimately responsible for program delivery while reserving the
primary front lines implementation role for willing and capable states.”).
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compliance promotion work is now done by the states with oversight from EPA. According to
one account, states conduct about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and
file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions.134 Moreover, the number of
state enforcement actions may dwarf the level of private enforcement, even under a statute such
as the CWA in which citizen enforcement historically has been high.135 Thus, assessments of the
efficacy of state performance are (or to be plausible must be) at the heart of efforts to evaluate
government enforcement performance more generally.136
The GAO and EPA’s OIG, among others, have documented significant deficiencies in
states’ performance.137 Both entities have reported inconsistencies in state environmental
enforcement, and the OIG characterized state enforcement programs as “underperforming,”
notwithstanding EPA’s efforts to improve state performance and oversight consistency.138
EPA’s enforcement office also has acknowledged serious deficiencies in state performance.
In an August 2013 draft strategy to improve oversight of state enforcement, EPA noted that its
reviews of state performance identified four “unresolved and recurring” significant issues
concerning state enforcement (or the integration of federal and state enforcement programs) that
require focused attention:
x
x
x
x

Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and incompleteness in national data systems,
which make it hard to identify when serious problems exist or to track state actions;
Routine failure of states to identify and report significant noncompliance;
Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate enforcement actions to return
violating facilities to compliance, potentially allowing pollution to continue unabated;
and
Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which results in ineffective
deterrence for noncompliance and an unlevel playing field for companies that do
comply.139
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McAllister, supra note 113, at 21. See also Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 11 (“A
significant proportion of inspections and enforcement actions are conducted by the states.”).
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See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 48, at 75-76 (reporting that referrals of enforcement cases to
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declining).
136
See Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note 59, at 3 (noting that given states’ substantial role under
federal pollution statutes, “state autonomy versus the extent of federal oversight is often at the center of debate with
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http://www.epa.gov/compliance/state/srf/index.html (2004-2012). See also EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note
124, at 11, 15-16 (identifying limited information and inconsistencies in EPA databases concerning state
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The upshot is that, as EPA’s OIG has found, “state enforcement programs frequently do
not meet national enforcement goals.”140 The OIG found that during fiscal years 2003 to 2009,
which was before some of the most significant funding declines described below occurred,
“performance was low across the board,” with some states performing far below average.141 For
example, EPA established a national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA emitters every
two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met that goal. As of 2009, EPA
set a national goal that states inspect 100% of CWA major permit holders every two years, but in
2010, only two states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and 13 states inspected
fewer than 50% of major facilities.142 Similarly, only two states met EPA’s target for inspections
of hazardous waste generators under RCRA, and states averaged inspections at only 62% of the
targeted number of facilities.143 The OIG concluded that EPA had failed to hold its regional
offices accountable for ensuring that states adequately enforce environmental laws, and that EPA
regions did not consistently intervene to correct state deficiencies.144
Given these challenges, as well as growing federal and state budget pressures, it has
become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on EPA’s traditional approach of inspecting
individual entities to increase compliance with the nation’s environmental laws and
regulations.145 EPA recently announced a new initiative—Next Generation Compliance—to
improve performance by capitalizing on advances in emissions monitoring and information
technology.146
B.

Declining Resources

enforcement and noting EPA’s difficulties in “accurately and consistently tracking the size of the regulated
populations”).
140
OIG, Improve Oversight, supra note 137, at 8.
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Id. at 8.
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 11, 15. Some statutes authorize EPA to withdraw authority for state permitting programs not administered
in accordance with statutory requirements. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (RCRA).
One of the prerequisites for delegation of permitting authority to the states is adequate state authority to carry out the
regulatory program, including enforcement requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). For discussion of EPA’s exercise
of that authority, see generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 5.
Statistics such as the number of enforcement actions brought or the amount of penalty dollars recovered in
enforcement actions do not necessarily correlate with either levels of environmental protection achieved or levels of
compliance. The need for enforcement action may fall, for example, if earlier steps in the regulatory process have
succeeded in making compliance easier and motivating regulated entities to comply. Nevertheless, EPA has
acknowledged problems in some states’ enforcement records and in EPA regional offices’ oversight of these
programs. See EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note 125, at 2-3 (“EPA’s current metrics [for state enforcement
activity] are based on the activities the states perform and not on the level of compliance within regulated sectors,
which is difficult to assess with the information currently available.”).
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GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 127, at 1-2.
146 See Giles, supra note 24; infra Parts IIB & III. The GAO has suggested that EPA develop a “strategic plan to
integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program.” GAO, Strategic Plan, supra
note 127, at 8. EPA is in the process of doing so. Id. at 9.
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The adequacy of government resources to promote compliance has been a long-standing
concern that seems unlikely to be addressed in the near term.147 Most of EPA’s annual funding
comes from discretionary appropriations. The agency’s funds increased sharply in the late
1970s, as EPA began implementing many of the foundational environmental laws adopted earlier
that decade.148 Funding dipped in the early 1980s and then leveled off until late in that decade,
after which it increased fairly regularly until fiscal year 2005.149 The enacted budget for the
agency fell slightly for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, bringing appropriations approximately
back to the amounts provided by Congress during the late 1990s.150 Adjusted for inflation,
EPA’s funding in fiscal year 2009 was slightly lower than it was in fiscal year 1978, according to
the CRS.151 After reaching a peak of $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2010, the agency’s budget
declined to about $8.5 billion in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and a little less in fiscal year
2013.152
Further cuts, perhaps significant ones, seem almost inevitable, at least in the near term.153
Environmental group spokespersons have characterized budget cuts for EPA as an indirect way
to weaken environmental regulations, likening the situation to “death by a thousand cuts.”154
These cuts are likely to affect the agency’s capacity to fulfill its responsibilities, including its
enforcement function. EPA announced in early 2014, for example, that increasing budget
pressure and resulting uncertainty had prompted it to reduce its workforce through employee
buyouts.155 EPA’s workforce had already declined between 2004 and 2012 during a period when
147
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the overall number of federal employees grew by 14 percent.156 Among other things, according
to a spokesperson for a government employees’ union, the buyouts will result in a reduction in
the number of enforcement official available to do inspections.157
The impact of a drop in real funding over the years has been magnified by the increase in
EPA’s regulatory responsibilities resulting from the enactment of new statutory programs (such
as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980158 and
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 1986159) and the expansion of
regulatory programs – often in ways that drew many new sources within the scope of those
programs – through amendments to RCRA in 1984,160 the CWA in 1987,161 and the CAA in
1990.162
The combination of EPA’s declining resource pool and increased responsibilities has
presented the agency with difficult choices, some of which may impair EPA’s enforcement
capacity.163 In late 2013, EPA issued a Draft Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2014 to 2018.164 In
the portion of the Plan devoted to the goal of protecting health and the environment by enforcing
laws and assuring compliance, EPA trumpeted its commitment to a “new enforcement paradigm”
under its Next Generation Compliance Initiative.165 EPA predicted that this Initiative would
156
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enhance enforcement and compliance by relying on innovative enforcement approaches that use
new monitoring and reporting technologies.166 News reports, however, focused on the portions
of the draft Plan indicating that EPA would cut federal inspections by one-third and reduce the
number of civil cases filed each year by 23 percent.167 EPA insisted that its decision to focus on
the biggest violators and to implement real-time monitoring of emissions to prevent violations
would enhance compliance.168 The shift in enforcement strategy appeared to have been induced
at least in part, however, by budgetary pressures, as reflected in the concession by a top EPA
enforcement official that “[o]bviously, necessarily with budget cuts, we have to make tough
choices.”169
The decline in resources available to the federal government for environmental protection
programs generally, and for enforcement functions specifically, is likely to have ripple effects on
the robustness of state programs.170 The federal government has long provided financial
assistance in the form of grants and loans to assist the states in performing their roles under the
federal environmental statutes. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2012, annual appropriations for
EPA categorical grants to assist states in implementing air, water, pesticide, and hazardous
substance programs shrunk by about $85 million.171 The Environmental Council of the States
(ECOS) has expressed concern about reductions in federal funding for state environmental
programs.172 Some within the federal government apparently share these concerns.173
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The reductions in federal financial support for the states were especially problematic
given that many states were cutting funds for their own agencies and enforcement programs at
the same time. ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 that reductions in state budgets for
environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state enforcement programs.174 Between
fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 24 states reduced funding for their environmental agencies,175
reflecting “an overall trend of decreasing budgets” for funding for state environmental agencies
and, according to ECOS, “jeopardiz[ing] states’ ability to implement federally delegated
programs and policies.”176 The CRS expressed concern about a mismatch between federal
support provided and state needs, noting that “[t]he adequacy of federal funds to assist states
with these responsibilities has become a more contentious issue over time, as state revenues and
spending generally have declined under recent economic conditions.”177 The GAO similarly
noted that “the importance of federal grants has increased, as some states have reduced their
funding for certain environmental programs to address decreased state revenues and significant
deficits in funding.”178
Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental programs by reducing staff
levels and cutting outreach and technical assistance programs that can facilitate compliance.179
State environmental officials have reported to the GAO that resource constraints have required
them to institute hiring freezes and reduce staff through attrition and layoffs. In addition, these
officials reported that funding freezes or declines have affected their capacity to conduct
activities such as permitting, inspections, and monitoring, all of which are critical to effective
enforcement.180
All of this is to say that implementation of environmental enforcement programs does not
occur in a static world. Rather, both the responsibilities and capacities of regulators shift over
time. Particularly when growing responsibilities, such as those described in the next section,
accompany shrinking resources, policymakers engaged in regulatory design should be cognizant
of and account for those realities.
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C.

Changes in the Regulated Community and Regulator Responsibilities and
Capacities: The Dynamic Character of Regulation

At the same time as resources available to agencies to enforce environmental laws have
diminished, challenges facing enforcement officials have shifted. Among the factors that have
made effective enforcement more daunting for some agencies and programs are an increase in
the number of regulated entities; increases in regulatory responsibilities and mandates for
agencies and regulated entities alike; implementation of programs that depend on making
difficult causal connections between regulated activities and environmental harms; a movement
in some contexts away from uniform regulatory treatment toward differentiated responsibility,
which may arise under market-based approaches to regulation or other deviations from
traditional regulatory tools; and a commitment to target significant violations by smaller sources
that have not traditionally been the focus of enforcement attention and activity.181
For various reasons, contemporary government enforcement officials would face
significant challenges in achieving effective enforcement of environmental laws even if the
financial resources available for enforcement were not declining. In some instances, the size of
the regulated community has grown.182 EPA has referred to the “breadth and expanding scope of
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) regulated universe” as one of the
challenges it faces in improving its enforcement performance.183 The number of point sources
subject to CWA permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year period.184 A recent
appellate court decision established, for example, that pesticide applications that allow chemical
residues to enter surface water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute.185 Stormwater
permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community.186
The resulting increase in regulated entities may present difficulties for federal and state
regulators.187 In New York, for example, regulated point sources increased by 63% between
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1999 and 2012.188 In some contexts, it may be possible to reduce the burdens of addressing
newly expanded categories of regulated sources through the creation of general permits, such as
the ones available under the CWA’s dredge and fill189 and NPDES190 permit programs. Indeed,
EPA has developed a general permit for pesticide and herbicide applications over surface
waters.191 General permits undoubtedly reduce the resource commitment a state must make at
the permit approval stage, but agencies continue to have ongoing responsibility for monitoring,
oversight of reporting, and inspections.192 If agencies seek to reduce their administrative burdens
by not only switching from source-specific to general permitting, but also by minimizing
oversight of sources covered by general permits through reduced inspections or sporadic review
of regulated entities’ reports, one trade-off will be a decline in verifiability and accountability.193
Changes in the nature of regulatory approaches also may complicate agency performance
of enforcement and compliance-related functions. For example, EPA has recently shifted its
focus in implementing the CWA from enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations
applicable to point sources to achieving state water quality standards through the implementation
of ambient quality-based effluent limitations.194 Water quality standards are often expressed in
terms of maximum ambient concentrations of pollutants in a surface water body, but are
sometimes couched in narrative terms. Implementation of such a standard requires a state
environmental agency to establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL), which is an aggregate
amount of pollution that may be discharged into a surface water body without resulting in
concentrations of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a state water quality
standard.195 Establishing enforceable limits, monitoring whether allowed loadings (clearly
188

Environmental Advocates of New York, Turning a Blind Eye to Illegal Pollution: DEC’s Failing Record on
Enforcing Environmental Laws 8 (Sept. 2013), http://www.eany.org/our-work/reports/turning-blind-eye-illegalpollution-september-2013.
189
33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
190
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a); California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 728 F.3d 868
(9th Cir. 2013) (involving California’s Industrial Activities Storm Water General Permit). See generally Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413
(2007).
191
See, e.g., Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General Permit for Point
Source Discharges From the Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011).
192
See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,775 (listing among Pesticide General Permit requirements the duties of applicators to
monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring activities). General NPDES permits may regulate one or
more discharge categories, provided all sources within a category are subject to the same or similar monitoring
requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D).
193
Efforts to enforce against private landowners, small businesses, or sectors of the business community (such as
agriculture) that traditionally have not been enforcement targets also may pose new challenges, such as increased
political opposition. Federal efforts to enforce wetlands permitting requirements under the CWA, for example, have
generated political opposition and adverse publicity. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Wetlands? What Wetlands?,
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/wetlands-what-wetlands/?_r=0 (Apr. 20, 2011) (describing Sackett v.
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), a CWA enforcement action to block construction of a single family home on property
alleged to contain regulated wetlands, as an example of the view of libertarians and tea party members that EPA is
the “embodiment of government run amok”).
194
See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 614 (6th ed. Aspen
Pub. 2011) (noting increase in the role of water quality standards).
195
Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1 st Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(1)(C)) (“A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum quantity of a pollutant that may be added to a water
body from all sources without exceeding applicable water quality standards, including ‘a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water

38

enforceable or less so) are producing desired environmental results, and adapting to the findings
are all resource-intensive enterprises, perhaps especially if the target is a vague narrative
standard rather than a numerical target.196 Determining whether a point source violated
technology-based effluent limits, which are expressed as caps on end-of-pipe discharges, is a
relatively simple matter by comparison. Agency efforts to improve water quality by restoring
and maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create similar ripple effects on
enforcement strategies.197 Expansion of the CWA permit program to cover stormwater
permitting may make regulators’ enforcement tasks more difficult because regulation of
stormwater discharges often takes the form of best management practices rather than end-of-pipe
discharge limits.198 It may be harder to track compliance status with mandates that take the form
of ongoing operating practices than it is for numerical discharge limits that can be monitored.199
As regulatory challenges change, so do enforcement challenges, affecting the implications of
available regulatory design options.
Shifting from traditional regulatory techniques such as technology-based limits that apply
to classes of regulated sources to market-based strategies that allow individual regulated entities
to alter their responsibilities through inter-source transactions is another change in regulatory
approach that is likely to create new enforcement challenges.200 Such a shift may make it more
difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of individual regulated
entities.201 Some emissions trading markets have been exploited through the sale of credits for
environmental improvements that would have occurred even without regulation, credits for
which sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another market, or credits that
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did not occur at all except on paper.202 Colorado noted that the burden on agencies to improve
compliance may increase when requirements are tailored rather than consistent across an
industry, not only because it will be more difficult for government inspectors to determine
compliance, but also because “it may be more difficult to implement a self-certification program
where individualized permits determine unique facility-specific compliance requirements.”203
A final development that may increase the difficulty of enforcement is the effort to
address significant environmental threats, even from sources that have not traditionally been the
focus of agency enforcement attention, and to address sources that are emitting or discharging
relatively small amounts, but whose violations may be cumulatively significant.204 If
enforcement initiatives target smaller sources, enforcers may have to initiate more actions and
commit more resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of environmental
improvement through enhanced compliance.205 In addition, data relevant to compliance status
may not be available to the same extent for small as for larger sources, making it more difficult
to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive as agencies must amass a data base
that does not exist or is incomplete.206
Changes in regulatory challenges are not entirely in the direction of making government
officials’ jobs more difficult. There are also opportunities to promote compliance that may
facilitate better performance. As Part III below indicates, these include improvements in
monitoring capacity and enhancements in the capacity to manage and disseminate data and other
information. Improved understanding of the mix of incentives that promote compliance also
holds promise for improving the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.207
D.

A Brief Conclusion Concerning the Importance of Context to Regulatory Design
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Part I seeks to demonstrate that policymakers designing or redesigning programs dealing
with regulatory enforcement and compliance promotion should be aware that the programs
operate in a multi-faceted context in which each part of the regulatory process may affect the
degree to which other parts are capable of achieving the goal of effective regulation. Further, it
highlights several contextual issues (such as the hybrid character of contemporary governance)
that deserve close attention. This Part has focused on two contextual issues as they apply to EPA
in particular. The first is the agency’s enforcement performance record and the impact on it of
the resource challenges it has faced and continues to face. The second is the dynamic nature of
regulation. Even if one were to take a snapshot of the regulatory process and fully assimilate the
interactions among the different phases of the regulatory process and actors participating in it,
that understanding is of time-limited value. Past experience with a regulatory program can and
should provide lessons that shape policymakers’ redesign efforts. Just as important, however, is
recognition that the regulatory landscape and the role of its participants changes, sometimes in
ways that significantly disrupt settled patterns. If policymakers assume a certain level of state
and private enforcement in structuring EPA’s own enforcement activities, they may find that the
aggregate level of enforcement is not what they anticipated or desired if, for example, state
funding of enforcement drops significantly. The same might be true if the Supreme Court were
to issue a decision sharply restricting standing for environmental NGOs in citizen suits.208 The
overarching point is that regulatory design needs to be undertaken, and revisited over time, with
a sophisticated understanding of the nature of the regulatory landscape that exists in a particular
regulatory setting and of the changes in this landscape that are likely to occur over time.
III.

A Review of EPA’s Initiative to “Transform” Compliance and Enforcement under the
Clean Water Act209

In this Part we provide a case study of an ongoing EPA regulatory redesign effort that
EPA has recently undertaken to bolster compliance promotion strategies under the CWA. We
examine EPA’s approach in the context of the holistic, contextual depiction of the enforcement
and compliance promotion function outlined above. In doing so, we are mindful of the view
some scholars have taken, which we have considered throughout the article, that rationalizing
public and private enforcement is a central challenge in the modern regulatory state.210 The
absence of this consideration from EPA’s reinvention effort, despite EPA’s possession of agency
gatekeeping authority and the significant level of private enforcer activity, raises important
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questions for conceptualizing and implementing strategies for enhancing enforcement and
compliance promotion.211
Over the past few years, EPA has acknowledged that its strategies for promoting
compliance with the CWA need improvement.212 In a July 2009 Memorandum, EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson told the head of EPA’s enforcement program, Cynthia Giles, that
“[w]e are . . . falling short [in] the effectiveness of our clean water enforcement programs,”213
and “the level of significant non-compliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably high .
. . .”214 Jackson accordingly directed Giles to develop an action plan to improve enforcement
performance.
In October 2009, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance (OECA)
issued the Agency’s Clean Water Action Plan.215 Echoing the Administrator’s concerns, OECA
noted that “[v]iolations are . . . too widespread, and enforcement too uneven.”216 OECA also
emphasized the challenge presented by a substantially increased universe of regulated parties:
“[t]he sheer magnitude of the expanding universe of the NPDES program itself, from roughly
100,000 . . . sources to nearly a million sources . . . presents challenges in how we regulate and
enforce the laws. . . .”217 EPA noted that the types of sources known to raise concerns has
evolved as well: when EPA developed its enforcement policies, it focused primarily on the
largest (or major) facilities with individual permits that are in significant noncompliance. But
211
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EPA had found a rate of serious noncompliance at about 45 percent of smaller facilities.218 EPA
had further concluded that “[i]t is likely that these smaller but more numerous sources are of
critical concern, especially where there are clusters of permitted facilities around impaired
waters.”219 OECA stated that EPA needed to “revamp” enforcement to meet these challenges.220
Based on its own assessment, and considerable outreach,221 OECA identified “three
major themes for action” to improve compliance, noting that its outreach efforts engendered a
“surprising coalescence” around these themes.222 The three themes, discussed below, are the
need to focus on the most significant threats to water quality and public health, to strengthen
EPA-state partnerships and improve the performance of each partner, and to improve
accountability and transparency.
A.

The Need to Focus Enforcement on the Most Significant Threats

The first theme for action identified in the CWAP is the need to focus enforcement on the
“biggest threats to water quality and public health.”223 This strategy (or approach to regulatory
design) might seem obvious. But as EPA pointed out, an unintended consequence of EPA’s
traditional focus on the biggest facilities (known in EPA parlance as “majors”) was that EPA
paid little attention to the “full range of the NPDES regulated universe,”224 including “nonmajor” sources whose discharges caused significant environmental problems. Thus, EPA’s first
theme seeks to prioritize enforcement-related efforts by ensuring that these efforts focus on the
most problematic sources regardless of size, which previously it had not done.
EPA identified a range of “new approaches and new tools” to address its proposed shift
in strategy.225 For example, it noted the need to improve data management to facilitate
218

Id. at 3.
Id. EPA acknowledged in the CWAP that, “[w]ithout complete and accurate data, it is hard to know how critical
the noncompliance at smaller facilities is to water quality.” Professor Dick Pierce recognized decades ago that
“[s]mall firms do not produce disproportionate quantities of social ‘goods.’ They do produce massively
disproportionate quantities of social ‘bads.’” Pierce, supra note 2, at 539. See also id. at 557 (noting that “small
firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the social bads that we attempt to reduce through regulation”); id. at
559 (“Small firms also are responsible for a massively disproportionate share of water and air pollution.”). Pierce
addressed small firms, not necessarily small facilities, but EPA’s assessment in the CWAP indicates that similar
conclusions may apply to small sources, especially when assessing the aggregate impacts of their discharges.
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CWAP, supra note 29, at Executive Summary, 5. EPA noted that some water quality problems are caused by
sources not currently being regulated. Id. at 6. Given our focus on regulatory design, not substantive regulatory
content, we do not address the need to revisit the scope of regulatory schemes (such as by covering nonpoint sources
currently exempt from most CWA regulation).
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NGOs. Id. at 5.
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Id. at 6. EPA has followed through since 2009. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cynthia Giles & Peter Silva on
Interim Guidance to Strengthen Performance in the NPDES Program (June 22, 2010), available at
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understanding the relationship between compliance problems and their impacts on water
quality.226 Data about water quality, permit limits, and permit violations “reside in different
systems and have not been routinely used together to help target serious problems.”227 EPA also
highlighted the importance of improving tools across the spectrum of regulation, indicating that
while responses might include enforcement actions, addressing water quality concerns also might
require fixing problematic regulations and improving operating permits.228 Last, the agency
focused on integrating its “state partners” better in its discussion about options for addressing the
“biggest threats.”229
In short, EPA’s strategy in addressing the first significant deficiency it identified in extant
compliance promotion efforts involved all four of the contextual design issues we identified
above. EPA’s goal of better integrating states into its enforcement initiatives reflects the hybrid
nature of the regulatory process (our first conceptual design challenge). The agency’s decision
to refocus its efforts stemmed from the “reality check” provided by past experience (our second
contextual design challenge), which showed that historically EPA had paid insufficient attention
to significant violators by focusing on a small subset of the regulated party universe. EPA’s
commitment to take advantage of improved technology to make easily accessible and
understandable information available to the public about compliance status, actions EPA and
states are taking to address problems, and the effects of those actions on water quality relates to
our third contextual design challenge (dynamism).230 And, finally, EPA’s decision to shift its
priorities reflects an agency effort to grapple with our fourth design issue (salience). Further, by
focusing on resolving data deficiencies (verifiability) and tools besides formal enforcement (the
available mix of rewards and sanctions), EPA considered some of the key components of an
effective enforcement and compliance program identified in Part IA; the Agency also recognized
the inter-related character of these components, noting, for example, that improved verifiability
and better use of sanctions are related.
B.

Strengthening the State/EPA Partnership

The second “major theme for action” that EPA identified in its CWAP, not entirely
distinct from the first, is the need to strengthen state performance. In most parts of the country,
states are the first line of CWA permitting and enforcement.231 The Plan noted that reviews of
226

Id. (noting that “[o]nce we have identified significant point source violations across the spectrum of regulated
facilities that adversely affect water quality, we will work with state programs to commence appropriate federal and
state civil and criminal enforcement actions”).
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Id. For example, OECA has indicated its’ receptivity to allowing states to scale back inspections and monitoring
at large facilities to free up resources for more intensive scrutiny at smaller facilities, where compliance rates are
lower. Reflecting the complexity of the cooperative federalism approach, however, another recent report indicates
that while states are ready to refocus their efforts, some EPA regional offices have expressed less willingness to
allow shifts in enforcement-related resources from large facilities to higher priority smaller ones. See EPA Plan for
Flexible Compliance Monitoring May Fall Short of States’ Goal, ENVTL. POLICY ALERT/INSIDE EPA (Oct. 2, 2013),
at 33 (noting that “some state officials said EPA regional officials do not appear open to . . . scaling back resourceintensive inspections at large facilities with typically good compliance records in exchange for more inspections at
smaller, less-reviewed plants”). This divergence in view stems from the hybrid nature of the regulatory process
(which entails both federal and state enforcement).
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CWAP, supra note 29, at 7.
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Forty-six states are currently authorized to implement the NPDES program. Id. at 8.

44

state performance identified widespread deficiencies, and EPA noted the importance of federal
oversight to motivate improvements in such performance:
[The many reviews of state permitting and enforcement performance] have identified a
lack of consistency in performance across states and highlighted common issues such as
permit backlogs, failure to identify significant noncompliance, or to take timely and
appropriate enforcement. EPA must consistently respond to these issues and press states
and ourselves to make the appropriate improvements in order to achieve equitable
protection to the public, a level playing field for competing businesses, and fairness
across states in how our environmental laws are enforced.232
EPA’s goal of better integration of federal and state enforcement involves the first of our
contextual design challenges – the idea that design efforts should take into account the role of
different stakeholders in a hybrid regulatory process. Particularly in the cooperative federalism
context built into the environmental statutes, it is unsurprising that EPA would make
rationalization of its relationship with the states a top priority.233 EPA enforcement leaders over
the past couple of decades have highlighted the importance of the state-federal partnership in
effective enforcement and compliance promotion.234
EPA’s focus in the CWAP on rationalizing federal and state enforcement efforts reflects
more than just our point about the importance of hybrid governance considerations to regulatory
design. EPA’s concerns extend to several of the key elements of effective enforcement and
compliance promotion we discuss above, including verifiability and the appropriate mix of
rewards and sanctions. The fact that EPA decided to so directly and publicly level its criticisms
of state performance implicates legitimacy concerns, another important element of effective
regulation. EPA’s decision to pursue improved enforcement in light of unacceptable past
performance reflects the importance of the “contextual design” issue of structuring future efforts
in light of assessments of past performance. The agency’s apparent decision to regard
rationalization of federal and state enforcement as a higher priority than the rationalization of
public and private enforcement implicates another of our contextual design issues (salience).235
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Id. These concerns are not new. One observer rendered this assessment 20 years ago: “Enforcement of
environmental laws by the EPA and the authorized states, however, has largely been an uncoordinated, piecemeal
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conflicting actions.” Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimideia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the
Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (1993). For book-length treatment, see
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impact public enforcement or desired levels of compliance.
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Thus, EPA’s goal of strengthening state performance bears on several elements of our conceptual
framework for improving regulatory design.
C.

Improving Accountability and Transparency

The third theme around which EPA and its stakeholders coalesced in the CWAP is the
need to improve accountability and transparency.236 As it did in identifying the Plan’s first two
themes, EPA acknowledged that it “lacks nationally consistent and complete information on the
facilities, permits, pollutant discharges and compliance status of most NPDES-regulated
facilities.”237 Data problems exist across the board, including “data quality, accuracy, and
completeness.”238 Inevitably, the infrastructure problem these data gaps represent “affects the
ability of EPA and states to identify violations . . . , connect violations to water quality impacts,
and to share information with the public.”239 The Plan notes that the “breadth and expanding
scope of the NPDES regulated universe” heightens the challenge of responding to the longstanding data problems.240 The CWAP indicates that, because of the size of the challenge and
the costs involved (it would cost over $100 million/year to generate the data EPA would like to
have), EPA will explore new ways to fill these data gaps, including using technological
advances.241
Innovative information-gathering technologies may facilitate the ability of regulators and
potential private enforcers to identify regulatory violations. Geographic information systems,
global positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already support the
investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in ways that were not previously
possible.242 Some of this technology is available to the public at little or no cost from federal or
state agencies.243 These technologies produce data that are more finely grained than cruder,
236

Thus, this theme relates directly to the third and fifth components of effective regulation described in Part IA,
verifiability and legitimacy.
237
CWAP, supra note 29, at 10.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
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holistic decisionmaking,” although he refers to geographic and temporal rather than process-oriented fragmentation
and does not address the implications of spatial analysis for enforcement. Id. at 223.
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time, at increasingly low cost,” revolutionizing responses to environmental problems”). See also Grabosky, supra
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previously available data and that can be more helpful in identifying environmental conditions,
violations, and violators. The data can strengthen the deterrent impact of regulations and foster
higher compliance levels if regulated entities recognize that ease of access to information may
make it easier for enforcers to prove violations.244
Invoking the experience with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, the CWAP
also touts the promise of transparency as a tool to improve compliance.245 EPA suggests that
public pressure and greater regulated party self-awareness can both motivate better performance.
For our purposes, the key point is that, in identifying strategies to improve compliance, EPA is
looking well beyond ex post enforcement and considering a range of tools throughout the
regulatory process. In doing so, it is by no means dismissing the value of traditional
enforcement; it is simply calling for use of additional tools to address compliance challenges, a
position we have taken in previous work246 and which academic literatures support.247
According to EPA, “[t]ransparency is not a replacement for regulatory enforcement, but can be
an effective driver for improved performance and accountability.”248 As others have noted,
changes in information technology can affect phases of the regulatory process other than ex post
enforcement. Better information, for example, can contribute to the adoption of more effective
regulation, planning, and permitting, which in turn can affect the extent of compliance and the
need for enforcement.249
The CWAP’s third theme illustrates how considerations relating to hybrid governance
and the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment can affect regulatory design choices, and
that these aspects of regulatory design may affect key characteristics of effective regulation,
including verifiability, the creation of appropriate compliance incentives, and regulatory
note 81, at 118 (noting the potential for digital technology to citizen enhance to “assist in labor-intensive
investigation of non-compliance”).
244
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legitimacy. The range and relative attractiveness of regulatory design options, both for
regulation as whole and for enforcement aspects of it, will shift over time as technology
advances, government capacity evolves in other ways, and more is learned about what works and
what doesn’t in achieving desired environmental results. Regulatory design decisions should
take full account of these contextual aspects of regulation.
D.

Enhancing Reinvention through Holistic Regulatory Evaluation

While EPA’s effort to improve enforcement and compliance efforts under the CWAP
reflect many of the aspects of our multi-layered approach to regulatory design, the application of
our framework to the initiative raises questions about several features of the CWAP. In this
section, we provide a few examples of how a more complete accounting of all of the layers of
our model for the design of regulatory enforcement and compliance programs might enrich
EPA’s analysis of each element of its CWAP.250
The first theme of EPA’s CWAP centers on expanding the range of enforcement efforts
to cover regulated sources previously ignored or deemphasized. EPA reasons that the discharges
of small sources, particularly in the aggregate, have the potential to create significant adverse
public health and environmental effects. Implicit in EPA’s decision to sweep these sources into
the agency’s enforcement program is that doing so should increase the prospects of achieving
desired levels of water quality. EPA may well prove to be correct, and as a normative matter we
hope so.
Conceptually, we encourage systematic consideration of the role our five key components
of effective enforcement and compliance might play as part of this new initiative. For example,
are there strategies that would improve the regulated community’s understanding of its
regulatory obligations and how to meet them, as Colorado did with hazardous waste small
quantity generators (our clarity component)?251 Smaller facilities are less likely than larger
counterparts to have access to sophisticated technical and legal advice.252 EPA has undertaken
such outreach in other settings.253 Similarly, what are the implications of achievability for EPA’s
enforcement strategies for smaller facilities? Are there steps EPA can and should take in light of
any achievability issues that are likely to materialize with respect to smaller facilities in
particular? Verifiability is a third component that deserves careful consideration in determining
how best to regulate a large universe of smaller facilities. Are there additional steps EPA should
consider to facilitate effective self-monitoring? Or actions that could facilitate more effective
government (EPA or state) monitoring and reporting? NGO capacity to participate in the
verifiability component is worth attention as well.
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These examples are intended to be illustrative of the value of using a conceptual framework of the sort we
propose in this article in considering reforms to the enforcement and compliance promotion function, rather than to
serve as a comprehensive assessment of options to enhance the CWAP.
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Our fourth and fifth components (the mix of rewards and sanctions, and legitimacy)
should influence when EPA brings cases against large and small facilities, and the relief the
agency should seek. Perceptions of legitimacy may increase, for example, if EPA’s enforcement
program targets all suspected significant violators, regardless of size, particularly if small sources
create adverse effects analogous to those resulting from discharges by larger facilities. On the
other hand, coercive enforcement against small entities may seem unfair and overbearing to
those sources if they lack adequate resources to comply, or if they lack the technical capacity to
identify and quickly resolve problems. EPA policies account for disparities in the regulated
community in terms of ability to pay;254 applying these fourth and fifth commitments, it would
be appropriate for the agency to consider proactively whether other special accommodations are
appropriate in deciding which suits to initiate and what relief to seek.
Our framework also suggests the value of deepening the analysis in connection with
EPA’s commitment in the second element of its plan to achieving a better integration of federal
and state enforcement efforts. EPA’s Plan does not address the role of citizen suits (an important
aspect of hybrid governance in the enforcement and compliance promotion arena) in addressing
the shortcomings it identified. The availability of citizen suits complicates the challenges of
rationalizing or integrating federal and state compliance inducement efforts because such suits
make it possible for three enforcers with different interests and capacities to take steps to address
particular alleged violations. The challenges, and opportunities, are significant because of the
significant number of actions citizen enforcers bring each year.255 Public enforcers have
considerable discretionary authority over the fate of private enforcement; to use Professor
Engstrom’s phrase, the major federal pollution control statutes empower EPA and the states to
serve as “gatekeepers” with respect to citizen suits.256 Nevertheless, there are significant limits
on EPA’s ability to influence citizen suit enforcers. A fully integrated analysis of the role of
public enforcement by federal and state authorities should include an assessment of strategies
that would “rationalize” the use of citizen suits so that, in combination, the three sets of enforcers
have the best change of halting significant violations and inducing desired levels of
compliance.257 For example, weak gatekeeping is likely to create uncertainty for regulated
entities (regarding the likelihood of suit, the types of relief to be sought, etc.). But strong
gatekeeping that significantly disables private enforcement may detract from the legitimacy of
the regulatory program if it is perceived as an effort by captured regulators to block public
participation in efforts to halt violations with significant public health or environmental
implications. While, therefore, we respectfully suggest that Professor Engstrom’s prescriptions
for rationalizing public and private enforcement lose some force because they largely exclude
state enforcement, EPA’s CWAP is similarly incomplete because it ignores the role of private
enforcement. A comprehensive effort to design an enforcement and compliance regime that is
254
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up to the challenges of hybrid governance needs to take account, at a minimum, of the roles of all
three enforcers, of how regulated entities are likely to react to the enforcement strategies of each,
and of how each enforcer’s effectiveness will be affected by the actions of the other two
enforcers.
The CWAP’s failure to consider the role of private enforcers in the CWA’s hybrid
enforcement program similarly may prevent the third aspect of EPA’s CWAP, reliance on new
information technology to enhance accountability and transparency, from completely fulfilling
its potential. The dynamic nature of changes in information technology means that the
economics, feasibility, and chances for success of enforcement will not remain static. Better
monitoring and the information it generates, for example, may motivate regulated parties not to
violate the law in the first place, thereby influencing the universe of cases that deserve formal
enforcement. Better monitoring and information might heighten the willingness of private
enforcers to pursue violators as information gathering costs decrease and the costs of success
rise. These developments may spur citizen suits that would not otherwise have been brought,
adding to the chances that regulatory policy will be set in the context of private litigation in ways
which the government deems unwise.258 As Professor Engstrom has noted, however, when
Congress created citizen suit provisions, it took into account and implicitly endorsed
enforcement by private litigants that public enforcers might choose not to pursue, thereby
“conferring democratic legitimacy, though at a higher level of generality,” on such enforcement
pursuits.259 Congress thus chose to forego a uniform enforcement regime in which expert federal
agencies have the sole power to decide which enforcement actions will promote legislative goals,
even though that might have been the best choice if its primary concern had been to avoid overdeterrence. Instead, Congress created a regime in which EPA shares its enforcement authority
with states, largely for reasons rooted in a desire to promote federalism values. It also shares that
authority with private enforcers, whose inclusion in the enforcement equation arguably promotes
legitimacy in addition to reflecting Congress’s intent to align enforcement capacity with levels of
noncompliance warranting enforcement action in light of government resource constraints.
These considerations are all relevant to policymakers as they consider the likely impacts of
improved information technology on the preferred structure of enforcement and compliance
programs.
IV.

Conclusion

Enforcement is generally thought to be an indispensable feature of effective governance.
The importance of using a holistic and systematic approach to consider reforms to agencies’
enforcement and compliance functions is difficult to overstate because of the interconnectedness
of the different components of an effective regulatory regime. Yet much agency effort to
improve enforcement fails to account for the entirety of the administrative state’s tools to
conduct its work.
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This concern has gotten traction with some Supreme Court justices. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“A Clean Water Act plaintiff
pursuing civil penalties acts as a self-appointed mini-EPA.”).
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the statutes specify who can sue and under what circumstances, private individuals and NGOs that qualify to bring
such suits are not self-appointed at all.
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This article fills a gap in the law review literature by offering a comprehensive
conceptual framework for considering how best to structure an enforcement and compliance
promotion regime. The “test run” we gave to the framework by applying it to a case study of an
ongoing EPA effort to reinvent its enforcement strategies under the Clean Water Act illustrated,
at least to us, the value of efforts of this sort to use a wide lens in considering reforms to
enforcement and compliance efforts.
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